This writ petition challenges a disciplinary order passed by an appellate authority in a statutory appeal under Rule 40 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1976 whereby the appellate authority upheld the findings of misconduct but modified the penalty from “dismissal from service” to “removal from service”. The disciplinary order proceeded on findings relating to (i) tarnishing the image of the organisation (Charge 1), (ii) bringing outside influence (Charge 3) and (iii) bypassing official channels (Charge 4).

The Ld. Single Judge emphasised the limits of judicial review and held –

“16. …A writ court does not sit as a court of appeal over departmental findings. Interference is warranted where the decision-making process is vitiated by breach of natural justice, patent procedural illegality, perversity, or findings that are unsupported by any evidence. Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lies outside writ review.”

and then noted three principal questions that arose for decision – (i) whether the proceedings are vitiated by bias or mala fides; (ii) whether the findings on Charges 1, 3 and 4 suffer from procedural impropriety or absence of evidence.

The Ld. Single Judge held –

            “A plea of mala fides must be founded on clear particulars and supported by cogent material… The relevant question is whether the authority acted as judge in a matter where personal interest demonstrably displaced institutional decision-making.”

and held that this threshold was not met since the penalty was modified indicating that the matter was not foreclosed by a predetermined outcome.

In this case, the petitioner’s core defence was that tweets and re-tweets were based on material already in the public domain, were deleted on objection, and represent legitimate whistleblowing and protected speech.

The Delhi High Court held – “A public sector employee’s speech rights are not extinguished, but they are mediated through conduct rules that insist on discipline, institutional propriety, and avoidance of conduct prejudicial to the employer’s interests” and further that “The gravamen is the method and platform: the public amplification of allegations of corruption against the organisation, coupled with attempts to mobilise external authorities and media pressure, and a deliberate departure from the prescribed internal route for grievance redressal.”.

The Ld. Single Judge held –

 “26. … In writ review, the question is narrower: whether there was “some evidence” supporting the departmental conclusion, and whether the conclusion is so unreasonable that no rational fact-finder could reach it.”

and further –

 “31. …the writ court is not divested of jurisdiction to examine proportionality of the penalty. Interference is exceptional and is warranted only where the punishment is so disproportionate to the misconduct proved that it shocks the conscience, in which event the Court may either remit the matter for reconsideration of penalty or, in a rare case, mould relief to shorten litigation.”

and finding the penalty to reflect “a manifest imbalance between the misconduct proved and the consequence imposed” interfered on the quantum of penalty but did not disturb the findings on misconduct.

The Court remitted the matter to the competent authority to reconsider penalty afresh within six weeks and partly allowed the writ petition.