Latest News Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ jurisdiction This writ petition challenges a disciplinary order passed by an appellate authority in a statutory appeal under Rule 40 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1976 whereby the appellate authority upheld the findings of misconduct but modified the penalty from “dismissal from service” to “removal from service”. The disciplinary order proceeded on findings relating to (i) tarnishing the image of the organisation (Charge 1), (ii) bringing outside influence (Charge 3) and (iii) bypassing official channels (Charge 4). The Ld. Single Judge emphasised the limits of judicial review and held – “16. …A writ court does not sit as a court of appeal over departmental findings. Interference is warranted where the decision-making process is vitiated by breach of natural justice, patent procedural illegality, perversity, or findings that are unsupported by any evidence. Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lies outside writ review.” and then noted three principal questions that arose for decision – (i) whether the proceedings are vitiated by bias or mala fides; (ii) whether the findings on Charges 1, 3 and 4 suffer from procedural impropriety or absence of evidence. The Ld. Single Judge held –             “A plea of mala fides must be founded on clear particulars and supported by cogent material… The relevant question is whether the authority acted as judge in a matter where personal interest demonstrably displaced institutional decision-making.” and held that this threshold was not met since the penalty was modified indicating that the matter was not foreclosed by a predetermined outcome. In this case, the petitioner’s core defence was that tweets and re-tweets were based on material already in the public domain, were deleted on objection, and represent legitimate whistleblowing and protected speech. The Delhi High Court held – “A public sector employee’s speech rights are not extinguished, but they are mediated through conduct rules that insist on discipline, institutional propriety, and avoidance of conduct prejudicial to the employer’s interests” and further that “The gravamen is the method and platform: the public amplification of allegations of corruption against the organisation, coupled with attempts to mobilise external authorities and media pressure, and a deliberate departure from the prescribed internal route for grievance redressal.”. The Ld. Single Judge held – “26. … In writ review, the question is narrower: whether there was “some evidence” supporting the departmental conclusion, and whether the conclusion is so unreasonable that no rational fact-finder could reach it.” and further –  “31. …the writ court is not divested of jurisdiction to examine proportionality of the penalty. Interference is exceptional and is warranted only where the punishment is so disproportionate to the misconduct proved that it shocks the conscience, in which event the Court may either remit the matter for reconsideration of penalty or, in a rare case, mould relief to shorten litigation.” and finding the penalty to reflect “a manifest imbalance between the misconduct proved and the consequence imposed” interfered on the quantum of penalty but did not disturb the findings on misconduct. The Court remitted the matter to the competent authority to reconsider penalty afresh within six weeks and partly allowed the writ petition. MADANJIT KUMAR v. CENTRAL ELECTRONICS LIMITED, W.P.(C) 13377/2018, DELHI HIGH COURT – 10 FEBRUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More Once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry unless circumstances change and further cognizable and non bailable… February 9, 2026/Read More  

Latest News Established jurisprudence developed under the Cr.P.C. on the scope and limits of consideration at the stages of discharge and framing of charge continues to hold the field under the BNSS. Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore whereby the High Court dismissed the accused’s appeal arising out of proceedings before the trial court under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Charges were framed under the IPC and the SCST Act. The sole point of challenge was the subsistence of charges under Section 3(1)(r) 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SCST Act against the accused. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “10. …For a charge under the above quoted provisions of the SCST Act to be established, several elements must be present. The accused must first commit an offence under the IPC, such as assault, robbery, or any other crime punishable with ten or more years of imprisonment. The act must be directed against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, or against property that belongs to them, reflecting the special protection the law affords to historically marginalized communities. In addition, the accused must have knowledge that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that the property belongs to such a person. This requirement of awareness is essential to the application of the law. Finally, the punishment prescribed under this sub-section is life imprisonment along with a fine, underscoring the gravity of offences committed against vulnerable communities.” Referring to the statutory text of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the Bench held – “the position is one of continuity rather than change in relation to the Court’s power at the stages of discharge and framing of charge. In both enactments, the governing standards are framed in materially the same language. At the stage of discharge, the Court is required to consider whether there is any sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused in sessions cases, or whether the charge is groundless in Magistrate warrant cases. At the subsequent stage, charges are to be framed only if the Court forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.”. The Supreme Court further observed that when the trial court had itself acknowledged that none of the statements u/s.161 CrPC stated the specific slurs were uttered by the accused with intent to insult, threaten or kill, then it could not be found on the same bundle of evidence and scrutiny that the alleged acts of the accused were informed by caste awareness. The Supreme Court held that “An appeal under Section 14-A of the SCST Act is a statutory first appeal” and further held – “19. …While the High Court is duty bound, as a first appellate Court, to independently apply its mind and correct errors committed by the Special Court, it must remain conscious of the stage of the proceedings and the corresponding limits of judicial scrutiny. This calibrated approach ensures that the protective object of the SC/ST Act is preserved, while simultaneously safeguarding against mechanical application of its provisions in cases where the statutory ingredients are not even prima facie disclosed.” The appeal was allowed to the limited extent that charges under the SCST Act were quashed.   DR. ANAND RAI v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR., SLP (Crl.) No.10711/2025, SUPREME COURT – 10 FEBRUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be read January 29, 2026/Read More Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More

Latest News Once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry unless circumstances change and further cognizable and non bailable offences are added. This appeal arises from an order passed by the High Court of Allahabad by which an anticipatory bail application preferred by the appellant was rejected. The case seemed to be one of dowry death. An FIR was registered u/s.80(2)/85 BNS and ss. 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by the mother of the deceased since the deceased died under mysterious circumstances at her matrimonial home. The appellant is the brother-in-law (devar) of the deceased. Anticipatory bail was granted by the High Court limited only up to filing of the chargesheet. Once the chargesheet was filed, the appellant again prayed for anticipatory bail which was rejected by the High Court. A 2-Judges bench of the Supreme Court held – “12. We fail to understand what is the idea in restricting the grant of anticipatory bail upto the stage of completion of investigation and filing of the chargesheet. Either the Court may grant anticipatory bail or may decline. However, once having exercised its discretion in favour of the accused upon consideration of the overall matter, there was no good reason for the High Court to restrict it upto the stage of filing of the chargesheet.” The Bench discussed earlier decisions on grant of anticipatory bail and held – “25. Thus, the position of law is well settled: once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry. The filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not terminate protection unless special reasons are recorded. The Constitution Bench in the case of Sushila Aggarwal (supra) held that duration is a matter of judicial discretion and cannot be confined by arbitrary timelines. In the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2011)1 SCC 694, this Court similarly cautioned that anticipatory bail should not hinge on procedural milestones. “26. Risk management can be taken care of by way of imposing conditions of cooperation, attendance, and non-tampering, not by imposing time limits. Where circumstances change, modification or cancellation may be sought under the BNSS, 2023, but expiry clauses inserted at inception are unsustainable.” and the order passed by the High Court was set aside. The Bench also took note of a situation where after an accused is released on bail, pending the investigation, and later upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet is filed with addition of new cognizable and non-bailable offences – in such circumstances “the correct approach of the Court concerned should be to apply its mind afresh as to whether the accused is entitled for grant of bail in the changed circumstances”. In respect of circumstances where after the grant of bail to an accused, further cognizable and non bailable offences are added, it was held – “34. …(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested. (ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his custody. (iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of its power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) respectively can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail. (iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.” SUMIT v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR., SLP(Crl.) No.1536/2026, SUPREME COURT – 09 FEBRUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More Once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry unless circumstances change and further cognizable and non bailable… February 9, 2026/Read More Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be read January 29, 2026/Read More  

Latest News Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be reade This case concerned a petition whereby the petitioner sought revival and reconsideration of a bail application, dismissed by the trial court solely on the ground that the application was “too voluminous and bulky” and that going through the same would “consume precious judicial time.”. The Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held – “9. …Dismissal of a bail application at the stage of final hearing without considering the grounds on which bail has been sought and without affording an opportunity of making oral submissions on merits, cannot be sustained.”. The Ld. Single Judge held – “11. …the right to be heard is not only a procedural formality, especially in proceedings relating to bail, where the liberty of an individual is at stake. The principle of audi alteram partem mandates that a litigant must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to advance his case. While courts are justified in insisting upon clarity, brevity, and discipline while drafting pleadings, the mere fact that an application is accompanied by extensive annexures or supporting judgments cannot, by itself, be a lawful ground to dismiss a bail application without adjudication. If the learned Trial Court was of the view that the pleadings required pruning or clarification, appropriate directions could have been issued, short of dismissing the application outright.” and further – “14. Judicial discipline requires that matters be decided on substance rather than rejected on form, and the liberty of an accused cannot be made to hinge upon the perceived ‘bulk’ of the papers placed before the Court. … A bail application cannot be rejected on the ground that a Judge is overwhelmed by the documents filed along with the pleadings. … …Dismissing the application without considering it on merits did not save judicial time; rather, it resulted in a situation where the same exercise would have to be repeated upon the filing of a fresh bail application, which would lead to duplication of proceedings.”. The Ld. Judge further held that that to “treat pleadings as a burden is to miss their true purpose”, “To non-suit such an application merely on the ground of its length is to overlook the labour, diligence and professional commitment that go into its preparation”. In conclusion, it was held – “32. Controlling the pleadings cannot be the prerogative of the Judge; controlling the Court is. If an advocate, in the facts of a given case, deems it appropriate to articulate multiple grounds for seeking bail, the Court cannot curtail such a right. At the same time, in the interest of effective adjudication, the Court may call for a concise note, written submissions, or such other assistance as may facilitate disposal of the matter. However, dismissal of a bail application merely on the ground that it runs into several pages would be a procedure unknown to law. Even where the case law relied upon is voluminous, the same could be called for or perused in digital form with appropriate bookmarks, thereby confining the core pleadings to the bail application itself. This Court, therefore, disapproves the manner in which the bail application was dismissed. Courts must exercise caution and care while dealing with bail applications and adjudicate them in accordance with settled principles of bail jurisprudence. Dismissing a bail application solely on the aforesaid ground, would amount to penalising an accused, who is in judicial custody, for the drafting choices of his counsel and would defeat the settled principles governing the grant, consideration and disposal of bail applications.” and the impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded to the trial court to consider the bail application afresh on merits, after affording an opportunity of hearing to both sides, and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, preferably within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the order. VIJAY GUPTA v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI), CRL.M.C. 242/2026, DELHI HIGH COURT – 29 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be read January 29, 2026/Read More Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More Supreme court to settle conflicting decisions regarding interpretation of the words “due date” in Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax… January 27, 2026/Read More

Latest News Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of evidence These appeals arose out of a judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta whereby the High Court directed demolition of a building constructed by the appellant on a plot of land admeasuring 0.39 acres, near the Visva-Bharati University, and also directed it to pay compensation of Rs.10,00,000/-, which was to be used for the purpose of restoration and preservation of the area in question, and costs of Rs.25,000/- to be paid to the petitioners. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed that even if there was any infirmity in the timing or manner of conversion of the subject plot, such infirmity could not have the effect of invalidating the entire construction- “34. …At best, such an infirmity would warrant regulatory scrutiny or corrective measures in accordance with law. It would not, however, justify the extreme consequence of demolition of a completed structure, particularly when the land was earmarked for “residential use” as per the Land Use and Development Control Plan, 2002 and the conversion was subsequently approved by the competent authority and no statutory provision mandated demolition as an automatic or inevitable consequence of such a defect.”. The Bench held – “52. Equally significant is the principle governing the exercise of jurisdiction in public interest litigation (PIL). While writ jurisdiction serves an important constitutional purpose, the burden squarely lies on the writ petitioners to place clear, cogent, and reliable material on record in support of the allegations made. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must remain circumspect while entertaining petitions that hinge upon disputed questions of fact, particularly where such disputes require detailed examination of evidence or adjudication of rival factual claims. Public interest litigation cannot be permitted to become a vehicle for selective or targeted challenges, nor can it be invoked to resolve contested factual issues which are not capable of determination on affidavits alone.” The appeal was allowed and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. M/S AARSUDAY PROJECTS & INFRASTRUCTURE (P) LTD v. JOGEN CHOWDHURY & ORS., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2920 OF 2018, SUPREME COURT – 29 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural January 9, 2026/Read More In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration January 9, 2026/Read More

Latest News Supreme court to settle conflicting decisions regarding interpretation of the words “due date” in Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 This appeal arises out of an impugned final judgment and order of September 2025 in an income tax appeal passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court took note of the conflicting opinions after recording the findings of the High Court to the effect –  Employer’s contributions under Section 36(1)(iv) and employees’ contributions covered under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x) are fundamentally different in nature and must be treated separately. Employees’ contribution deducted from their salaries are deemed to be income under Section 2(24)(x) and are held in trust by the employer. The employers can claim deduction only if they deposit these amounts on or before the statutory due date under Section 36(1)(va).  The non-obstante clause in Section 43B cannot be applied to employees’ contributions governed by Section 36(1)(va). Alom Extrusions (supra) has been distinguished as the same has not considered Sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va). Explanation 5 to Section 43B was not considered at all while arriving at the decision that employees’ contribution must be deposited on or before the due dates under relevant statutes.” For ease of reference, section 36(1)(va) is reproduced below – “36. (1) The deductions provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred to in section 28— … (va) any sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions of sub-clause (x) of clause (24) of section 2 apply, if such sum is credited by the assessee to the employee’s account in the relevant fund or funds on or before the due date. [Explanation 1].—For the purposes of this clause, “due date” means the date by which the assessee is required as an employer to credit an employee’s contribution to the employee’s account in the relevant fund under any Act, rule, order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise. [Explanation 2.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the provisions of section 43B shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have been applied for the purposes of determining the “due date” under this clause;]” The Bench recorded that there were two School of thoughts as regards the interpretation of the words “due date” – (1) due date specified under the relevant PF, ESI Act and (2) due date of filling of return under Section 139(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Bench said that it “would like to look into this issue” and issued notice returnable in four weeks. WOODLAND (AERO CLUB) PRIVATE LIMITED DIRECTOR v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, SLP (C) NO.1532/2026, SUPREME COURT – 27 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More Supreme court to settle conflicting decisions regarding interpretation of the words “due date” in Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax… January 27, 2026/Read More Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural January 9, 2026/Read More

Latest News Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural This case concerned a revision petition filed by a landlord against the order of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi (“ARC”) dismissing his eviction petition citing bona fide requirement. The ARC had also granted leave to defend to the tenant. The Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held – “18. Further, no doubt, as held in Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) the landlord is the best judge of his needs, it has also been held therein that the need urged by the landlord must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural, and the like. In fact, as also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemichand [1966 MP LJ 26 (S.C.)] and Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde [(1999) 4 SCC 1], should there arise any suspicion/ doubt in the mind of the Court as to the genuineness of the bona fide requirement urged by the landlord, the burden is upon the landlord to clear all such doubts. Clearly, the landlord herein has not been able to discharge the said burden.”. The revision petition was dismissed holding that there were contradictions, non-filing of requisite documents by the landlord and no proper evidence led by the landlord to prove his case, citing Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(1998) 8 SCC 119] and Abid-Ul-Islam vs. Inder Sain Dua [(2022) 6 SCC 30]. The Delhi High Court did not interfere with the findings of the ARC stating that in revisional jurisdiction, the scope is itself limited. SH. SANKET BEHARI MITTAL v. SH. SUBHASH CHAND GUPTA, RC.REV. 589/2019, DELHI HIGH COURT – 09 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural January 9, 2026/Read More In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration January 9, 2026/Read More Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the… January 8, 2026/Read More

Latest News In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration The short issue which arose for consideration in this appeal was whether the Family Court committed any jurisdictional error or material irregularity in modifying the interim visitation arrangement, by reducing the extent and frequency of visitation, in exercise of its discretionary powers, keeping in view the welfare of the minor daughter as the paramount consideration? A 2-Judges Bench of the Delhi High Court held – “11. … It is well settled that, in matters concerning custody and visitation, the welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration, overriding all other considerations, including the convenience or preference of either parent. The Court must ensure that the child’s physical safety, emotional well-being, and opportunities for healthy development are safeguarded, while promoting meaningful contact with both parents wherever possible. Any modification of visitation rights must, therefore, be guided by evidence demonstrating a clear need for change in order to protect the child’s welfare, rather than on speculative or minor disputes between the parents.”. The Bench further held – “15. … It is well settled that the power to modify visitation arrangements is not to be exercised merely on considerations of convenience or routine parental disagreement, but only where circumstances are demonstrated to have a material impact on the welfare of the child. In assessing the competing contentions, this Court recognizes that while a parent is entitled to regular and meaningful visitation, such interaction must not expose the child to circumstances likely to cause physical harm, emotional distress, or psychological instability.”. The Bench also noted that approximately twenty litigations were pending between the parties and their respective family members – “19. …reflecting the acrimonious nature of their relationship. Such multiplicity of proceedings demonstrates that the marital discord has translated into prolonged adversarial litigation. While each party asserts its legal rights, this Court cannot be unmindful of the fact that sustained inter se conflict between parents has a direct bearing on the emotional and psychological well-being of a minor child, particularly one of tender age. During the formative years, a child requires stability, emotional security, and an environment insulated, as far as possible, from parental discord. The Courts exercising jurisdiction in custody and visitation matters are therefore duty-bound to ensure that the child does not become a casualty of ongoing disputes between the parents.”. The Bench found no perversity, jurisdictional error, or material irregularity in the exercise of discretion by the Family Court and dismissed the appellant father’s appeal holding – “20. …It is well settled that an appellate court ought not to substitute its own view for that of the court of first instance in matters of discretionary interim arrangements, unless the decision is shown to be manifestly arbitrary or contrary to the welfare of the child, which is not the case herein. Moreover, only interim arrangement for visitation has been made which is open to modification, change and, increased if circumstances permit.”. JAGMEET CHOPRA v. BASANT SAWHNEY, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 433/2025, DELHI HIGH COURT – 09 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration January 9, 2026/Read More Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the… January 8, 2026/Read More Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent December 17, 2025/Read More

Latest News Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 This appeal concerned criminal complaints filed under s.138 read with ss. 141 & 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in respect of dishonour of cheques. The issues that arose for consideration were: (a) Whether the High Court was right in quashing a complaint case and consequential summoning order against Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 arising out of the dishonour of the firm’s cheque, on the ground that it related to the same underlying liability for which another complaint case had already been instituted and whether it did not amount to a ‘mini trial’ prohibited u/s.482 of the Cr.PC; and b) Whether the High Court erred in not quashing the criminal proceedings against Respondent No.2 arising out of 3 complaint cases filed against him. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court referred to settled legal principles that govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s.482 of the Cr.PC and held – “26. … This Court in catena of judgments has emphasised that the High Court must avoid usurping the function of a Trial Court or conducting a mini trial when disputed factual questions attend the maintainability of a complaint. In a much recent decision of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2021) 19 SCC 401], a three-Judge Bench had held that the power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly, and only where the complaint, even if accepted in full, discloses no offence or continuation would amount to abuse of process of law.” and referred to the directions to the High Courts to be kept in mind while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC. The Bench further held – “28. On these lines, it is apt clear that even though the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.PC are very wide, its conferment requires the High Court to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any complaint or FIR, the High Page Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not.”. The Bench held that a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete. The fact that multiple cheques arise from one transaction will not merge them into a single cause of action. However, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s.482 of the Cr.PC cannot be used to decide disputed issues. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and was not justified in quashing the complaint case and summoning order. For the second issue, the Supreme Court referred to the decision in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others [(2000) 2 SCC 745], wherein a Division Bench of the Supreme Court had highlighted the ingredients which are to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the NI Act and held that the High Court was justified in not quashing the complaint cases against Respondent No. 2 because they prima facie disclosed ingredients of the offence u/s.138 NI Act. SUMIT BANSAL v. M/S MGI DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS & ANR., CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 141/2026, SUPREME COURT – 08 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the… January 12, 2026/Read More Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent December 17, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 17, 2025/Read More  

Latest News Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent. The reference arose from a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court concerning the timeline prescribed for the presentation of a petition for divorce by mutual consent under section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”). In light of the divergent opinion of the Division Bench, it formulated specific questions of law and requested Hon‘ble the Chief Justice to place the matter before a Full Bench for authoritative determination. The legal questions referred to the Full Bench read as follows: (a)   Whether a petition u/s.13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act can be filed by the parties before completing the period of separation of one year?; (b)   If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, whether the period of six months between the presentation of the First Motion u/s.13B(1) and the Second Motion u/s.13B(2), can be waived off by a court even though the parties have not been living separately for more than one year on the date when such waiver is prayed for? The 3-Judges Bench of the Delhi High Court considered various decisions of the Supreme Court considered Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 and recorded – “23. It is in the foregoing context that we must consider four aspects: First, whether the Family Court and the High Court can completely waive the 01-year period stipulated under section 13B(1) of the HMA, by allowing parties to present the first motion even before they have lived separately for at least 01-year, by invoking the proviso to section 14(1) of the HMA. Second, whether such waiver should be permitted only in cases of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent as contemplated in the proviso to section 14(1). Third, in a case where the 01-year period under section 13B(1) is waived, can the Family Court and the High Court also waive the 06-month cooling-off period stipulated under section 13B(2) of the HMA. Fourth, having waived the 01-year period under section 13B(1) and the 06-month period under section 13B(2) of the HMA, can the court allow the second motion and grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent that is effective forthwith, or, can the second motion be allowed and the divorce decree granted only after expiration of the 01-year separation period stipulated under section 13B(1).”. The Bench summarised its conclusions as under – “57.1. The statutory period of 01-year prescribed under section 13B(1) of the HMA as a pre-requisite for presenting the first motion, can be waived, by applying the proviso to section 14(1) of the HMA; 57.2. The waiver of the 01-year separation period under section 13B(1) of the HMA does not preclude waiver of the 06-month cooling-off period for filing the second motion under section 13B(2); and waiver of the 01-year period under section 13B(1), and the 06-month period under section 13B(2), are to be considered independently of each other; 57.3. Where the court is satisfied that the 01-year period under section 13B(1) and the 06-month period under section 13B(2) of the HMA deserve to be waived, the court is not legally mandated to defer the date from which the divorce decree would take effect, and such decree may be made effective forthwith; 57.4. Such waiver is not to be granted merely for the asking but only upon the court being satisfied that circumstances of ―exceptional hardship to the petitioner‖ and/or ―exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent‖ exist, while also testing the case on the anvil of the considerations set-out in Pooja Gupta; 57.5. Waiver, as above, can be granted both by the Family Court as well as the High Court; and 57.6. As contemplated in the proviso to section 14(1) of the HMA, where a court finds that the waiver of the 01-year period under section 13B(1) has been obtained by misrepresentation or concealment, the court may defer the date on which the divorce would take effect, as may be considered appropriate; or may dismiss the divorce petition, at whichever stage it is pending, without prejudice to the right of the parties to present a fresh petition under section 13B(1) of the HMA after expiration of the 01-year period, on the same or substantially the same facts as may have been pleaded in the petition so dismissed. The reference was answered in these terms SHIKSHA KUMARI v. SANTOSH KUMAR, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 111/2025, DELHI HIGH COURT – 3 JUDGES BENCH – 17 DECEMBER 2025. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent December 18, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 17, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 9, 2025/Read More