Latest News Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later agreement. The dispute arose from a redevelopment project involving Hirani Developers and members of a housing society. The original development agreement of 2011 contained an arbitration clause. Subsequently, individual society members entered into permanent alternate accommodation agreements with the developer in 2023 and 2024 regarding accommodation arrangements during redevelopment. These later agreements did not contain a separate arbitration clause, however clause 14 provided that all terms and conditions of the earlier development agreement shall be construed to form a part of the agreements and all clauses thereof would be binding on the parties. Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties and some members approached the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The developer invoked arbitration and issued notices seeking the appointment of an arbitrator. The respondents refused, arguing that no arbitration agreement existed between the developer and individual members. The Bombay High Court accepted the argument and dismissed applications filed u/s. 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Againat that order, the developer approached the Supreme Court. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court cited s.7(5) and held – “8. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act is titled ‘Arbitration agreement’. Section 7(5) therein provides that the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause would constitute an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.” Referring to clause 14, the Bench further held –             “12. This was, thus, not a case of mere reference to an earlier agreement but a case where the parties to the later contract clearly intended to import the Development Agreement, body and soul, into the later agreements. Therefore, there can be no doubt as to the incorporation of Clause 36 of the Development Agreement, i.e., the arbitration clause, into the Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements. Viewed thus, the High Court was in error in its understanding of the legal position obtaining under Section 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, as explained by this Court in the aforestated decisions. This was a fit case for the High Court to have accepted the plea of the appellant that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties by incorporation.” and set aside the impugned order, allowed the appeal and appointed a sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes and differences between the appellant and the respondent members. HIRANI DEVELOPERS v. NEHRU NAGAR SAMRUDDHI CHS LTD. & ANR. ETC., SLP (C) Nos. 38407-38411 of 2025, SUPREME COURT – 13 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the findings of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II whereby the labour court allowed the travel allowance claim of the workman filed u/s.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dispute centres on whether the workman remained entitled to payments of travel allowance / dearness allowance/ conveyance after cessation of employment. The Delhi High Court held – “11. … it is apposite to observe that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, while examining an Award passed by the Labour Court, is supervisory in nature and circumscribed in scope. It is well settled that the High Court does not act as an appellate authority over the findings returned by the Labour Court. Interference is warranted only where the Award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or where material evidence has been ignored. … The award of the Labour Court can be set aside only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record.” With respect to the filing of an application u/s.33C(2), it was held – “the power conferred by Section 33C(2) is one of computation and recovery and not of adjudication. Where the very foundation of the claim is in dispute, the workman must first have his entitlement recognised by the appropriate forum, and only thereafter may he invoke Section 33C(2) for the purpose of computing and recovering the benefit so recognised.” The Ld. Single Judge held that the application u/s.33C(2) was not maintainable. It was held –             “33. Thus, the present case exemplifies a situation where the Labour Court has effectively assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate a disputed industrial claim under the guise of computation, thereby transgressing the statutory limits of Section 33C(2). Such an approach not only runs contrary to settled law but also undermines the carefully structured scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, which delineates distinct forums and procedures for adjudication and execution. In the absence of any prior adjudication, award, settlement, or statutory provision recognising the claimed right, the Respondent’s claim was not one of computation simpliciter, but one requiring foundational adjudication.” The writ petition was allowed, the findings of the labour court were quashed and set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the claim of the workman u/s.33C(2) was dismissed as not maintainable. ALLAHABAD BANK v. R.S. SAINI, W.P.(C) 7096/2007, DELHI HIGH COURT – 12 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News Situs of employment and place where termination takes effect are determinative factors for identifying the “appropriate Government” in industrial disputes. The writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the workman challenged a labour court award whereby it was held that the Government of NCT of Delhi was not the “appropriate Government” for making the reference and consequently the claim of the workman was held to be not maintainable. A Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held – “Courts have consistently held that the jurisdiction of a Labour Court to adjudicate an industrial dispute must have a direct and substantial nexus with the territory of the Government making the reference. The expression “appropriate Government” as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act contemplates the Government having jurisdiction over the industry or establishment in relation to which the dispute substantially arises. It is in this context that the situs of employment assumes significance.” and further held – “32. The legal position governing the present controversy is now fairly well settled. In disputes arising out of termination of service, it is ordinarily the place where the workman was lastly employed and where the alleged termination took effect that constitutes the determinative factor for deciding territorial jurisdiction. The principle is founded upon the rationale that the industrial dispute substantially crystallises at the place where the employment subsisted and where the adverse employment action operated against the workman.” The Delhi High Court observed that once the workman himself admitted that he was discharging duties at Faridabad, Haryana on the date of alleged termination, the labour court cannot be faulted for holding that the industrial dispute substantially arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Haryana and held – “40. An admission made in pleadings is a judicial admission of the highest order. It is well settled that a party is bound by its pleadings and ordinarily cannot be permitted to travel beyond the same in an attempt to improve or alter the nature of their case.” The Ld. Single Judge held that the impugned award did not suffer from perversity or patent illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference under Article 226, the impugned award was upheld and the writ petition was dismissed. It was however clarified that dismissal of the writ petition shall not preclude the workman from availing remedies available in law before the appropriate forum and the appropriate Government having jurisdiction, and if not otherwise barred by law. RAJESHWAR DAYAL AGGARWAL v. M/S ENICAR MACHINE (INDIA), W.P.(C) 9849/2016, DELHI HIGH COURT – 11 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More Situs of employment and place where termination takes effect are determinative factors for identifying the “appropriate Government” in industrial disputes. May 11, 2026/Read More

Latest News upreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage This appeal arises from a matrimonial dispute between the parties which resulted in a settlement arrived at during mediation. However, the respondent-wife resiled from the same, withdrew her consent for the mutual divorce at the time of second motion and instituted proceedings under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”). The husband-petitioner filed a quashing petition. The high court in the quashing petition passed an interim order issuing notice, and agreed to continue the D.V. proceedings directing the respondent-wife to deposit a certain amount and retain the jewellery received by her in terms of the settlement agreement. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant-husband filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and an application seeking decree of divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. The following issues arose for consideration – (1) Whether proceedings under the DV Act should be quashed? (2) Whether any party can back out from a settlement arrived at in mediation proceedings? If yes, in what situation? (3) Whether the Supreme Court can exercise its powers under Article 142(1) to grant a decree of divorce to the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and if yes, on what terms and conditions? A 2-Judges bench of the Supreme Court held on Issues (1) and (2) – “30. It is trite law that once the parties have entered into a settlement agreement which was duly authenticated by the mediator, in case of any resilement from such terms as agreed upon in the settlement, the resiling party must be encumbered with heavy costs. Any deviation from the terms of the settlement arrived in mediation and later confirmed by the Court should be dealt with strictly as such deviation harbors an attack to the foundational basis of the entire process of mediation. … The exception to the above rule is that a party can resile from the Settlement Agreement arrived in the mediation proceedings is, if it successfully demonstrates that the said Settlement Agreement was procured by force, fraud or undue influence. The party can also resile from the Settlement Agreement on account of non-fulfillment of any of the conditions by the opposite party as set out in the Settlement Agreement.” and observed that they were not impressed by the reasons given by the respondent-wife for resiling out of the settlement agreement, there were no specific allegations regarding any sort of domestic violence that could emanate from the pleadings and thus quashed the proceedings under the DV Act holding that “the continuance of which would be an abuse of the process of law”. On Issue (3) after referring to a catena of judgments and observing that the jurisprudence pertaining to the grant of divorce under Article 142(1) on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has been developed with caution through various judgments, the Bench held – “49. A perusal of the dicta laid down by this Court in the above mentioned judgments and several others holding authority on the said law point makes it crystal clear that the Court while exercising its power under Article 142(1) for grant of divorce has to first conclude that there has been an irretrievable breakdown of marriage.” and concluded on the basis of materials and conduct of the parties that this was a fit case for exercise of powers under Article 142(1) to grant a divorce as there had been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The Bench further passed directions. DHANANJAY RATHI v. RUCHIKA RATHI, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1924/2026, SUPREME COURT – 13 APRIL 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More

Latest News Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great circumspection These batch of appeals by special leave related to disputes arising out of development of a residential layout and involved common accused persons, interconnected transactions and identical issues concerning the scope of interference by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). Though each complaint contained certain individual-specific allegations with reference to distinct plot numbers and instances of criminal intimidation, etc. the gravamen of accusations was identical i.e. alleged creation of forged General Powers of Attorney, execution of sale deeds, and subsequent confirmation deeds in respect of the same survey land. Complaints were submitted to the jurisdictional police stations that declined to entertain the same, upon which private complaints were presented before the relevant Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who by an order exercised powers under s.156(3) of CrPC and directed that the complaints be forwarded to the jurisdictional police for registration of an FIR and investigation in accordance with law. FIRs were registered by the jurisdictional police stations. Aggrieved by proceedings emanating from the FIRs, quashing petitions were filed in the high court u/s.482 CrPC that were allowed opining that the identity of the land and the question of overlap between the rival claims constituted seriously disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication by a competent civil court. Thus, this batch of appeals. The core question which arose for consideration was whether in the peculiar facts of the case, the high court was justified in exercising jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC to quash the complaints and FIRs at a stage when the Magistrate had merely directed investigation u/s.156(3) CrPC. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed that allegations involved not only physical acts of trespass and destruction, but also fraud, fabrication of documents and unlawful interference with property rights. The Bench observed that “the dispute between the parties is predominantly civil in nature and that criminal proceedings could not be sustained unless the registered sale deeds were first cancelled by resorting to proceedings under Section 31 of SRA” [Specific Relief Act, 1963]. The Bench held – “52. In the present set of appeals, the proceedings were at a nascent stage. The Magistrate had merely exercised jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC and directed investigation by the police. It cannot be gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to merely peruse the application filed by the complainant and examine whether the facts disclosed therein prima facie disclose the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences requiring investigation by police. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed, then he would be fully justified in directing the concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with investigation in accordance with law. The High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, must remain circumspect in interfering with such an exercise of power and ought to intervene only where it is evident that the order lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or that the same may result in failure of justice. In such circumstances, the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should not travel beyond the allegations contained in the complaint and the material placed by the complainant by delving into the defences sought to be projected by the accused-respondents. … This Court has, time and again, emphasised that criminal investigation ought not to be scuttled at the threshold except in cases where the complaint ex facie does not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence or where continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The power of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great circumspection, bearing in mind the statutory duty of the investigating agency to inquire into cognizable offences. The said position has been eruditely explained by this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401…” The appeals were allowed, orders passed by the high court were set aside and the FIRs and the proceedings arising therefrom were revived and restored to the file of the concerned police stations and/or Magistrate, for being proceeded in accordance with law, holding –             “56. …it was not at all justified for the High Court to have quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception. Such an approach runs contrary to the principles consistently laid down by this Court.” ACCAMMA SAM JACOB v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. ETC., CRIMINAL APPEAL 2026, SUPREME COURT – 13 APRIL 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 16, 2026/Read More Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More  

Latest News Law does not favour the indolent The question that arose in this case was as to whether a notice seeking commencement of arbitration, issued on 02.06.2022, could set in motion the process of resolution of a dispute regarding a work completed as early as on 30.07.2000. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “6. Arbitration though is an alternate dispute resolution system, which has to be encouraged, it cannot deviate from the fundamental principle that law favours the diligent and not the indolent. Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies the Limitation Act, 1963 to arbitrations as it is applied to proceedings in Court. Hence, for recovery of amounts, as in this case, the limitation is three years as provided in Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The commencement of arbitration proceedings as per sub-section (2) of Section 43 being the date referred in Section 21, which is the date on which a request for initiation of arbitration is received by the respondent, the claim itself was hopelessly time barred, the notice having been issued after 21 years.” It was observed that despite the work having concluded on 30th July 2000, the petitioner did not attempt to raise a bill or initiate the arbitration proceedings till 2022, when a notice requiring commencement of arbitration proceedings was first issued. The Bench held that the high court erred in holding that limitation was extended due to failure on the part of the Engineer-in-Charge to determine the final amount payable. It was held that if there was such failure, it was for the contractor to have initiated arbitration then and there. Neither was notice issued for arbitration nor was a final bill raised or a request made to determine the total amount payable. The appeal was allowed and order initiating arbitration was set aside. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. M/S B.B.M. ENTERPRISES, CIVIL APPEAL NO.4320/2026, SUPREME COURT – 09 APRIL 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More Law does not favour the indolent April 9, 2026/Read More

Latest News Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ jurisdiction This writ petition challenges a disciplinary order passed by an appellate authority in a statutory appeal under Rule 40 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1976 whereby the appellate authority upheld the findings of misconduct but modified the penalty from “dismissal from service” to “removal from service”. The disciplinary order proceeded on findings relating to (i) tarnishing the image of the organisation (Charge 1), (ii) bringing outside influence (Charge 3) and (iii) bypassing official channels (Charge 4). The Ld. Single Judge emphasised the limits of judicial review and held – “16. …A writ court does not sit as a court of appeal over departmental findings. Interference is warranted where the decision-making process is vitiated by breach of natural justice, patent procedural illegality, perversity, or findings that are unsupported by any evidence. Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lies outside writ review.” and then noted three principal questions that arose for decision – (i) whether the proceedings are vitiated by bias or mala fides; (ii) whether the findings on Charges 1, 3 and 4 suffer from procedural impropriety or absence of evidence. The Ld. Single Judge held –             “A plea of mala fides must be founded on clear particulars and supported by cogent material… The relevant question is whether the authority acted as judge in a matter where personal interest demonstrably displaced institutional decision-making.” and held that this threshold was not met since the penalty was modified indicating that the matter was not foreclosed by a predetermined outcome. In this case, the petitioner’s core defence was that tweets and re-tweets were based on material already in the public domain, were deleted on objection, and represent legitimate whistleblowing and protected speech. The Delhi High Court held – “A public sector employee’s speech rights are not extinguished, but they are mediated through conduct rules that insist on discipline, institutional propriety, and avoidance of conduct prejudicial to the employer’s interests” and further that “The gravamen is the method and platform: the public amplification of allegations of corruption against the organisation, coupled with attempts to mobilise external authorities and media pressure, and a deliberate departure from the prescribed internal route for grievance redressal.”. The Ld. Single Judge held – “26. … In writ review, the question is narrower: whether there was “some evidence” supporting the departmental conclusion, and whether the conclusion is so unreasonable that no rational fact-finder could reach it.” and further –  “31. …the writ court is not divested of jurisdiction to examine proportionality of the penalty. Interference is exceptional and is warranted only where the punishment is so disproportionate to the misconduct proved that it shocks the conscience, in which event the Court may either remit the matter for reconsideration of penalty or, in a rare case, mould relief to shorten litigation.” and finding the penalty to reflect “a manifest imbalance between the misconduct proved and the consequence imposed” interfered on the quantum of penalty but did not disturb the findings on misconduct. The Court remitted the matter to the competent authority to reconsider penalty afresh within six weeks and partly allowed the writ petition. MADANJIT KUMAR v. CENTRAL ELECTRONICS LIMITED, W.P.(C) 13377/2018, DELHI HIGH COURT – 10 FEBRUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More Once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry unless circumstances change and further cognizable and non bailable… February 9, 2026/Read More  

Latest News Established jurisprudence developed under the Cr.P.C. on the scope and limits of consideration at the stages of discharge and framing of charge continues to hold the field under the BNSS. Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore whereby the High Court dismissed the accused’s appeal arising out of proceedings before the trial court under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. Charges were framed under the IPC and the SCST Act. The sole point of challenge was the subsistence of charges under Section 3(1)(r) 3(1)(s) and 3(2)(va) of the SCST Act against the accused. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “10. …For a charge under the above quoted provisions of the SCST Act to be established, several elements must be present. The accused must first commit an offence under the IPC, such as assault, robbery, or any other crime punishable with ten or more years of imprisonment. The act must be directed against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe, or against property that belongs to them, reflecting the special protection the law affords to historically marginalized communities. In addition, the accused must have knowledge that the victim belongs to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe or that the property belongs to such a person. This requirement of awareness is essential to the application of the law. Finally, the punishment prescribed under this sub-section is life imprisonment along with a fine, underscoring the gravity of offences committed against vulnerable communities.” Referring to the statutory text of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) and the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the Bench held – “the position is one of continuity rather than change in relation to the Court’s power at the stages of discharge and framing of charge. In both enactments, the governing standards are framed in materially the same language. At the stage of discharge, the Court is required to consider whether there is any sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused in sessions cases, or whether the charge is groundless in Magistrate warrant cases. At the subsequent stage, charges are to be framed only if the Court forms an opinion that there is a ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence.”. The Supreme Court further observed that when the trial court had itself acknowledged that none of the statements u/s.161 CrPC stated the specific slurs were uttered by the accused with intent to insult, threaten or kill, then it could not be found on the same bundle of evidence and scrutiny that the alleged acts of the accused were informed by caste awareness. The Supreme Court held that “An appeal under Section 14-A of the SCST Act is a statutory first appeal” and further held – “19. …While the High Court is duty bound, as a first appellate Court, to independently apply its mind and correct errors committed by the Special Court, it must remain conscious of the stage of the proceedings and the corresponding limits of judicial scrutiny. This calibrated approach ensures that the protective object of the SC/ST Act is preserved, while simultaneously safeguarding against mechanical application of its provisions in cases where the statutory ingredients are not even prima facie disclosed.” The appeal was allowed to the limited extent that charges under the SCST Act were quashed.   DR. ANAND RAI v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ANR., SLP (Crl.) No.10711/2025, SUPREME COURT – 10 FEBRUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be read January 29, 2026/Read More Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More

Latest News Once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry unless circumstances change and further cognizable and non bailable offences are added. This appeal arises from an order passed by the High Court of Allahabad by which an anticipatory bail application preferred by the appellant was rejected. The case seemed to be one of dowry death. An FIR was registered u/s.80(2)/85 BNS and ss. 3 & 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 by the mother of the deceased since the deceased died under mysterious circumstances at her matrimonial home. The appellant is the brother-in-law (devar) of the deceased. Anticipatory bail was granted by the High Court limited only up to filing of the chargesheet. Once the chargesheet was filed, the appellant again prayed for anticipatory bail which was rejected by the High Court. A 2-Judges bench of the Supreme Court held – “12. We fail to understand what is the idea in restricting the grant of anticipatory bail upto the stage of completion of investigation and filing of the chargesheet. Either the Court may grant anticipatory bail or may decline. However, once having exercised its discretion in favour of the accused upon consideration of the overall matter, there was no good reason for the High Court to restrict it upto the stage of filing of the chargesheet.” The Bench discussed earlier decisions on grant of anticipatory bail and held – “25. Thus, the position of law is well settled: once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry. The filing of a charge-sheet, taking of cognizance, or issuance of summons does not terminate protection unless special reasons are recorded. The Constitution Bench in the case of Sushila Aggarwal (supra) held that duration is a matter of judicial discretion and cannot be confined by arbitrary timelines. In the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2011)1 SCC 694, this Court similarly cautioned that anticipatory bail should not hinge on procedural milestones. “26. Risk management can be taken care of by way of imposing conditions of cooperation, attendance, and non-tampering, not by imposing time limits. Where circumstances change, modification or cancellation may be sought under the BNSS, 2023, but expiry clauses inserted at inception are unsustainable.” and the order passed by the High Court was set aside. The Bench also took note of a situation where after an accused is released on bail, pending the investigation, and later upon completion of the investigation, chargesheet is filed with addition of new cognizable and non-bailable offences – in such circumstances “the correct approach of the Court concerned should be to apply its mind afresh as to whether the accused is entitled for grant of bail in the changed circumstances”. In respect of circumstances where after the grant of bail to an accused, further cognizable and non bailable offences are added, it was held – “34. …(i) The accused can surrender and apply for bail for newly added cognizable and non-bailable offences. In the event of refusal of bail, the accused can certainly be arrested. (ii) The investigating agency can seek order from the court under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively for arrest of the accused and his custody. (iii) The Court, in exercise of its power under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) of Cr.P.C. respectively, can direct for taking into custody the accused who has already been granted bail after cancellation of his bail. The Court in exercise of its power under Section 437(5) as well as Section 439(2) respectively can direct the person who has already been granted bail to be arrested and commit him to custody on addition of graver and non-cognizable offences which may not be necessary always with order of cancelling of earlier bail. (iv) In a case where an accused has already been granted bail, the investigating authority on addition of an offence or offences may not proceed to arrest the accused, but for arresting the accused on such addition of offence or offences it needs to obtain an order to arrest the accused from the Court which had granted the bail.” SUMIT v. STATE OF U.P. & ANR., SLP(Crl.) No.1536/2026, SUPREME COURT – 09 FEBRUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More Once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry unless circumstances change and further cognizable and non bailable… February 9, 2026/Read More Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be read January 29, 2026/Read More  

Latest News Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be reade This case concerned a petition whereby the petitioner sought revival and reconsideration of a bail application, dismissed by the trial court solely on the ground that the application was “too voluminous and bulky” and that going through the same would “consume precious judicial time.”. The Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held – “9. …Dismissal of a bail application at the stage of final hearing without considering the grounds on which bail has been sought and without affording an opportunity of making oral submissions on merits, cannot be sustained.”. The Ld. Single Judge held – “11. …the right to be heard is not only a procedural formality, especially in proceedings relating to bail, where the liberty of an individual is at stake. The principle of audi alteram partem mandates that a litigant must be afforded a meaningful opportunity to advance his case. While courts are justified in insisting upon clarity, brevity, and discipline while drafting pleadings, the mere fact that an application is accompanied by extensive annexures or supporting judgments cannot, by itself, be a lawful ground to dismiss a bail application without adjudication. If the learned Trial Court was of the view that the pleadings required pruning or clarification, appropriate directions could have been issued, short of dismissing the application outright.” and further – “14. Judicial discipline requires that matters be decided on substance rather than rejected on form, and the liberty of an accused cannot be made to hinge upon the perceived ‘bulk’ of the papers placed before the Court. … A bail application cannot be rejected on the ground that a Judge is overwhelmed by the documents filed along with the pleadings. … …Dismissing the application without considering it on merits did not save judicial time; rather, it resulted in a situation where the same exercise would have to be repeated upon the filing of a fresh bail application, which would lead to duplication of proceedings.”. The Ld. Judge further held that that to “treat pleadings as a burden is to miss their true purpose”, “To non-suit such an application merely on the ground of its length is to overlook the labour, diligence and professional commitment that go into its preparation”. In conclusion, it was held – “32. Controlling the pleadings cannot be the prerogative of the Judge; controlling the Court is. If an advocate, in the facts of a given case, deems it appropriate to articulate multiple grounds for seeking bail, the Court cannot curtail such a right. At the same time, in the interest of effective adjudication, the Court may call for a concise note, written submissions, or such other assistance as may facilitate disposal of the matter. However, dismissal of a bail application merely on the ground that it runs into several pages would be a procedure unknown to law. Even where the case law relied upon is voluminous, the same could be called for or perused in digital form with appropriate bookmarks, thereby confining the core pleadings to the bail application itself. This Court, therefore, disapproves the manner in which the bail application was dismissed. Courts must exercise caution and care while dealing with bail applications and adjudicate them in accordance with settled principles of bail jurisprudence. Dismissing a bail application solely on the aforesaid ground, would amount to penalising an accused, who is in judicial custody, for the drafting choices of his counsel and would defeat the settled principles governing the grant, consideration and disposal of bail applications.” and the impugned order was set aside and the matter remanded to the trial court to consider the bail application afresh on merits, after affording an opportunity of hearing to both sides, and to pass appropriate orders in accordance with law, preferably within a period of ten days from the date of receipt of the order. VIJAY GUPTA v. STATE (NCT OF DELHI), CRL.M.C. 242/2026, DELHI HIGH COURT – 29 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Cases cannot be dismissed on the premise that the pleadings are bulky requiring time and effort to be read January 29, 2026/Read More Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More Supreme court to settle conflicting decisions regarding interpretation of the words “due date” in Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax… January 27, 2026/Read More