Latest News Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same or substantially similar allegations on the doctrine of res judicata. This case concerns a criminal appeal that challenged an order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, rejecting the appellant’s petition seeking quashing of proceedings emanating from an F.I.R registered in 2024. The question that arose for consideration was whether the High Court was justified in declining to quash the FIR and proceedings arising therefrom, despite rejection by the magistrate of an application u/s.156(3) of the Cr.PC founded on substantially the same allegations. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “Sections 154, 156(3) and 190 disclose a graded statutory scheme, the ordinary and primary recourse of an informant lies with the Police under Section 154 Cr.PC, recourse to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is a step properly taken where that primary recourse has failed or been refused and cognizance under Section 190 is a distinct and subsequent stage, triggered by any of the three contingencies noted above, and not confined to a police report consequent upon a Section 173 of the Cr.PC direction alone.” and further held – “The jurisdiction under Section 156(3), therefore, is confined to directing investigation… The question which therefore arises is whether rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same or substantially similar allegations by operation of the doctrine of res judicata.” The Bench answered this in the negative and held – “the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations” and “cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC”. The Bench further reiterated the principles of exercising jurisdiction u/s.482 – “the Court is concerned only with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. At that stage, the Court does not embark upon an enquiry into the correctness, reliability or probative value of the material relied upon by either side.”. The Bench observed that allegations in the FIR unquestionably disclosed the commission of cognizable offences warranting investigation and accordingly dismissed the appeal. PRAMOD KUMAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS., CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3931/2026, SUPREME COURT – 19 AUGUST 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More

Latest News What is ‘own wrong’ to attract the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) HMA. This case concerns an appeal u/s.19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 assailing the Judgment and Decree of a Principal Judge, Family Courts, Delhi whereby the divorce petition filed by the husband u/ss.13(1A) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”) was dismissed. The primary contention raised by the husband was that there was no valid marriage between the parties, though matrimonial ceremonies were conducted, the husband was under the influence of a sedative substance at that time rendering the marriage voidable and the parties had been living separately for a number of years. The wife contended that she was always willing to rejoin the company of the husband but the husband deserted her without sufficient cause and reason, and she filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that s.5 HMA provides for essential conditions for a valid Hindu Marriage, the contravention of which results in a marriage being void as per s.11 and the husband’s case does not relate to contravention of any stipulated conditions. His allegations of being under the influence of a sedative substance could make the marriage voidable for which a petition for annulment had to be presented within one year of discovery. The Bench further held that the dispute about the validity of marriage was challenged by the husband in the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights, and the issue was decided against him and had attained finality. The Bench further held –             “after passing of a decree of judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, when the parties fail to resume cohabitation for a period of one year or more, a decree of divorce could be granted at the instance of either of the parties… the Court is empowered to examine the conduct of the party seeking divorce and if it finds that the relief is being sought on the basis of the petitioner’s own wrongdoing, the Court may refuse to grant such relief”. It was further held –             “On one hand, he disputed the validity of the marriage itself and on the other hand, he sought dissolution of the very same marriage under the garb of Sections 13(1)(ib) and 13(1A) of the HMA. A party cannot approbate and reprobate simultaneously, i.e., disputing the factum of marriage while simultaneously praying for its dissolution under the HMA. Therefore, the said conduct of the appellant evidently falls in the category of ‘own wrong’ and is sufficient to attract the provision of Section 23(1)(a) HMA. Whereas, no positive act has been committed by the respondent to create a situation so as to make it impossible for the appellant to resume cohabitation.”. The appeal was dismissed. X v. Y, MAT. APP. (F.C.) 252/2018, DELHI HIGH COURT – 18 AUGUST 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More What is ‘own wrong’ to attract the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) HMA August 18, 2026/Read More Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News What is a First Degree for admission to 3-year LL.B. course in India. This case concerned a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging a communication of the University cancelling the provisional admission of the Petitioner to the 3-year LL.B. course on the ground that his degree was obtained from a London University and did not constitute a qualifying ‘First Degree’ for seeking admission to the 3-year LL.B. course in India. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961; the Rules of Legal Education, 2008 and the BCI Notification of 26th August 2020 to arrive at its conclusion. The Bench considered the Rules and held –             “The provisions thus consistently contemplate a sequence – an applicant must first possess a qualifying graduation-level qualification and thereafter pursue the three-year degree course in law. This is not merely a requirement as to the nomenclature of the qualification. It reflects the very structure of the three-year LL.B. course as a second-stage professional law degree.”  It further held –             “We therefore find that the Petitioner’s foreign undergraduate law degree, merely by reason of its recognition by the BCI for the purposes contemplated under the applicable regulatory framework, cannot be treated as the antecedent ‘First Degree’ required under Rules 2(xxxi), 4(a) and 5(a) for admission to the three-year LL.B. course in India.”. The Bench also considered the Petitioner’s grievance that the University, after granting provisional admission and accepting tuition fees, cancelled the admission by a brief communication without issuing a show cause notice, assigning reasons or affording an opportunity of hearing. The Bench then held –             “A provisional admission or acceptance of tuition fees cannot confer an entitlement contrary to the governing statutory framework”. The writ petition was dismissed and it was recorded –             “…we hold that the Petitioner’s three-year undergraduate law degree obtained from Queen Mary University of London cannot, merely by reason of its recognition by the BCI for the purposes contemplated under the regulatory framework governing foreign law degrees, be treated as the qualifying ‘First Degree’ for admission to the three-year LL.B. course in India. The BCI Notification dated 26th August 2020 does not lead to a different conclusion.”. YOHAAN ABRAHAM v. CHHATRAPATI SHIVAJI MAHARAJ UNIVERSITY & BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA, W.P. No.4739/2026, BOMBAY HIGH COURT – 14 AUGUST 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More What is ‘own wrong’ to attract the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) HMA August 18, 2026/Read More What is a First Degree for admission to 3-year LL.B. course in India August 14, 2026/Read More

Latest News Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later agreement. The dispute arose from a redevelopment project involving Hirani Developers and members of a housing society. The original development agreement of 2011 contained an arbitration clause. Subsequently, individual society members entered into permanent alternate accommodation agreements with the developer in 2023 and 2024 regarding accommodation arrangements during redevelopment. These later agreements did not contain a separate arbitration clause, however clause 14 provided that all terms and conditions of the earlier development agreement shall be construed to form a part of the agreements and all clauses thereof would be binding on the parties. Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties and some members approached the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The developer invoked arbitration and issued notices seeking the appointment of an arbitrator. The respondents refused, arguing that no arbitration agreement existed between the developer and individual members. The Bombay High Court accepted the argument and dismissed applications filed u/s. 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Againat that order, the developer approached the Supreme Court. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court cited s.7(5) and held – “8. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act is titled ‘Arbitration agreement’. Section 7(5) therein provides that the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause would constitute an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.” Referring to clause 14, the Bench further held –             “12. This was, thus, not a case of mere reference to an earlier agreement but a case where the parties to the later contract clearly intended to import the Development Agreement, body and soul, into the later agreements. Therefore, there can be no doubt as to the incorporation of Clause 36 of the Development Agreement, i.e., the arbitration clause, into the Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements. Viewed thus, the High Court was in error in its understanding of the legal position obtaining under Section 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, as explained by this Court in the aforestated decisions. This was a fit case for the High Court to have accepted the plea of the appellant that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties by incorporation.” and set aside the impugned order, allowed the appeal and appointed a sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes and differences between the appellant and the respondent members. HIRANI DEVELOPERS v. NEHRU NAGAR SAMRUDDHI CHS LTD. & ANR. ETC., SLP (C) Nos. 38407-38411 of 2025, SUPREME COURT – 13 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the findings of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II whereby the labour court allowed the travel allowance claim of the workman filed u/s.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dispute centres on whether the workman remained entitled to payments of travel allowance / dearness allowance/ conveyance after cessation of employment. The Delhi High Court held – “11. … it is apposite to observe that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, while examining an Award passed by the Labour Court, is supervisory in nature and circumscribed in scope. It is well settled that the High Court does not act as an appellate authority over the findings returned by the Labour Court. Interference is warranted only where the Award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or where material evidence has been ignored. … The award of the Labour Court can be set aside only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record.” With respect to the filing of an application u/s.33C(2), it was held – “the power conferred by Section 33C(2) is one of computation and recovery and not of adjudication. Where the very foundation of the claim is in dispute, the workman must first have his entitlement recognised by the appropriate forum, and only thereafter may he invoke Section 33C(2) for the purpose of computing and recovering the benefit so recognised.” The Ld. Single Judge held that the application u/s.33C(2) was not maintainable. It was held –             “33. Thus, the present case exemplifies a situation where the Labour Court has effectively assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate a disputed industrial claim under the guise of computation, thereby transgressing the statutory limits of Section 33C(2). Such an approach not only runs contrary to settled law but also undermines the carefully structured scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, which delineates distinct forums and procedures for adjudication and execution. In the absence of any prior adjudication, award, settlement, or statutory provision recognising the claimed right, the Respondent’s claim was not one of computation simpliciter, but one requiring foundational adjudication.” The writ petition was allowed, the findings of the labour court were quashed and set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the claim of the workman u/s.33C(2) was dismissed as not maintainable. ALLAHABAD BANK v. R.S. SAINI, W.P.(C) 7096/2007, DELHI HIGH COURT – 12 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News Situs of employment and place where termination takes effect are determinative factors for identifying the “appropriate Government” in industrial disputes. The writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the workman challenged a labour court award whereby it was held that the Government of NCT of Delhi was not the “appropriate Government” for making the reference and consequently the claim of the workman was held to be not maintainable. A Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held – “Courts have consistently held that the jurisdiction of a Labour Court to adjudicate an industrial dispute must have a direct and substantial nexus with the territory of the Government making the reference. The expression “appropriate Government” as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act contemplates the Government having jurisdiction over the industry or establishment in relation to which the dispute substantially arises. It is in this context that the situs of employment assumes significance.” and further held – “32. The legal position governing the present controversy is now fairly well settled. In disputes arising out of termination of service, it is ordinarily the place where the workman was lastly employed and where the alleged termination took effect that constitutes the determinative factor for deciding territorial jurisdiction. The principle is founded upon the rationale that the industrial dispute substantially crystallises at the place where the employment subsisted and where the adverse employment action operated against the workman.” The Delhi High Court observed that once the workman himself admitted that he was discharging duties at Faridabad, Haryana on the date of alleged termination, the labour court cannot be faulted for holding that the industrial dispute substantially arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Haryana and held – “40. An admission made in pleadings is a judicial admission of the highest order. It is well settled that a party is bound by its pleadings and ordinarily cannot be permitted to travel beyond the same in an attempt to improve or alter the nature of their case.” The Ld. Single Judge held that the impugned award did not suffer from perversity or patent illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference under Article 226, the impugned award was upheld and the writ petition was dismissed. It was however clarified that dismissal of the writ petition shall not preclude the workman from availing remedies available in law before the appropriate forum and the appropriate Government having jurisdiction, and if not otherwise barred by law. RAJESHWAR DAYAL AGGARWAL v. M/S ENICAR MACHINE (INDIA), W.P.(C) 9849/2016, DELHI HIGH COURT – 11 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More Situs of employment and place where termination takes effect are determinative factors for identifying the “appropriate Government” in industrial disputes. May 11, 2026/Read More

Latest News upreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage This appeal arises from a matrimonial dispute between the parties which resulted in a settlement arrived at during mediation. However, the respondent-wife resiled from the same, withdrew her consent for the mutual divorce at the time of second motion and instituted proceedings under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”). The husband-petitioner filed a quashing petition. The high court in the quashing petition passed an interim order issuing notice, and agreed to continue the D.V. proceedings directing the respondent-wife to deposit a certain amount and retain the jewellery received by her in terms of the settlement agreement. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant-husband filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and an application seeking decree of divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. The following issues arose for consideration – (1) Whether proceedings under the DV Act should be quashed? (2) Whether any party can back out from a settlement arrived at in mediation proceedings? If yes, in what situation? (3) Whether the Supreme Court can exercise its powers under Article 142(1) to grant a decree of divorce to the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and if yes, on what terms and conditions? A 2-Judges bench of the Supreme Court held on Issues (1) and (2) – “30. It is trite law that once the parties have entered into a settlement agreement which was duly authenticated by the mediator, in case of any resilement from such terms as agreed upon in the settlement, the resiling party must be encumbered with heavy costs. Any deviation from the terms of the settlement arrived in mediation and later confirmed by the Court should be dealt with strictly as such deviation harbors an attack to the foundational basis of the entire process of mediation. … The exception to the above rule is that a party can resile from the Settlement Agreement arrived in the mediation proceedings is, if it successfully demonstrates that the said Settlement Agreement was procured by force, fraud or undue influence. The party can also resile from the Settlement Agreement on account of non-fulfillment of any of the conditions by the opposite party as set out in the Settlement Agreement.” and observed that they were not impressed by the reasons given by the respondent-wife for resiling out of the settlement agreement, there were no specific allegations regarding any sort of domestic violence that could emanate from the pleadings and thus quashed the proceedings under the DV Act holding that “the continuance of which would be an abuse of the process of law”. On Issue (3) after referring to a catena of judgments and observing that the jurisprudence pertaining to the grant of divorce under Article 142(1) on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has been developed with caution through various judgments, the Bench held – “49. A perusal of the dicta laid down by this Court in the above mentioned judgments and several others holding authority on the said law point makes it crystal clear that the Court while exercising its power under Article 142(1) for grant of divorce has to first conclude that there has been an irretrievable breakdown of marriage.” and concluded on the basis of materials and conduct of the parties that this was a fit case for exercise of powers under Article 142(1) to grant a divorce as there had been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The Bench further passed directions. DHANANJAY RATHI v. RUCHIKA RATHI, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1924/2026, SUPREME COURT – 13 APRIL 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More

Latest News Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great circumspection These batch of appeals by special leave related to disputes arising out of development of a residential layout and involved common accused persons, interconnected transactions and identical issues concerning the scope of interference by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”). Though each complaint contained certain individual-specific allegations with reference to distinct plot numbers and instances of criminal intimidation, etc. the gravamen of accusations was identical i.e. alleged creation of forged General Powers of Attorney, execution of sale deeds, and subsequent confirmation deeds in respect of the same survey land. Complaints were submitted to the jurisdictional police stations that declined to entertain the same, upon which private complaints were presented before the relevant Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate who by an order exercised powers under s.156(3) of CrPC and directed that the complaints be forwarded to the jurisdictional police for registration of an FIR and investigation in accordance with law. FIRs were registered by the jurisdictional police stations. Aggrieved by proceedings emanating from the FIRs, quashing petitions were filed in the high court u/s.482 CrPC that were allowed opining that the identity of the land and the question of overlap between the rival claims constituted seriously disputed questions of fact requiring adjudication by a competent civil court. Thus, this batch of appeals. The core question which arose for consideration was whether in the peculiar facts of the case, the high court was justified in exercising jurisdiction u/s.482 CrPC to quash the complaints and FIRs at a stage when the Magistrate had merely directed investigation u/s.156(3) CrPC. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed that allegations involved not only physical acts of trespass and destruction, but also fraud, fabrication of documents and unlawful interference with property rights. The Bench observed that “the dispute between the parties is predominantly civil in nature and that criminal proceedings could not be sustained unless the registered sale deeds were first cancelled by resorting to proceedings under Section 31 of SRA” [Specific Relief Act, 1963]. The Bench held – “52. In the present set of appeals, the proceedings were at a nascent stage. The Magistrate had merely exercised jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC and directed investigation by the police. It cannot be gainsaid that while exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of CrPC, the Magistrate is required to merely peruse the application filed by the complainant and examine whether the facts disclosed therein prima facie disclose the necessary ingredients of cognizable offences requiring investigation by police. The Magistrate is not expected to undertake an exhaustive evaluation of evidence nor adjudicate upon the merits of the allegations. If the Magistrate arrives at the conclusion that prima facie a cognizable offence is disclosed, then he would be fully justified in directing the concerned SHO to register an FIR and proceed with investigation in accordance with law. The High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC, must remain circumspect in interfering with such an exercise of power and ought to intervene only where it is evident that the order lacks any legal foundation; suffers from perversity or that the same may result in failure of justice. In such circumstances, the High Court, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction, should not travel beyond the allegations contained in the complaint and the material placed by the complainant by delving into the defences sought to be projected by the accused-respondents. … This Court has, time and again, emphasised that criminal investigation ought not to be scuttled at the threshold except in cases where the complaint ex facie does not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence or where continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law. The power of the High Court under Section 482 of CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interdict investigation is to be exercised with great circumspection, bearing in mind the statutory duty of the investigating agency to inquire into cognizable offences. The said position has been eruditely explained by this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 19 SCC 401…” The appeals were allowed, orders passed by the high court were set aside and the FIRs and the proceedings arising therefrom were revived and restored to the file of the concerned police stations and/or Magistrate, for being proceeded in accordance with law, holding –             “56. …it was not at all justified for the High Court to have quashed proceedings merely on the ground that the dispute appeared to be civil in nature. It is well settled that the mere existence of a civil remedy does not by itself bar criminal proceedings where the allegations prima facie disclose commission of a cognizable offence. By entering into an evaluation of the dispute on merits and proceeding to quash the order directing investigation, the High Court effectively stifled the investigative process at its inception. Such an approach runs contrary to the principles consistently laid down by this Court.” ACCAMMA SAM JACOB v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. ETC., CRIMINAL APPEAL 2026, SUPREME COURT – 13 APRIL 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 16, 2026/Read More Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More  

Latest News Law does not favour the indolent The question that arose in this case was as to whether a notice seeking commencement of arbitration, issued on 02.06.2022, could set in motion the process of resolution of a dispute regarding a work completed as early as on 30.07.2000. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “6. Arbitration though is an alternate dispute resolution system, which has to be encouraged, it cannot deviate from the fundamental principle that law favours the diligent and not the indolent. Section 42 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies the Limitation Act, 1963 to arbitrations as it is applied to proceedings in Court. Hence, for recovery of amounts, as in this case, the limitation is three years as provided in Article 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The commencement of arbitration proceedings as per sub-section (2) of Section 43 being the date referred in Section 21, which is the date on which a request for initiation of arbitration is received by the respondent, the claim itself was hopelessly time barred, the notice having been issued after 21 years.” It was observed that despite the work having concluded on 30th July 2000, the petitioner did not attempt to raise a bill or initiate the arbitration proceedings till 2022, when a notice requiring commencement of arbitration proceedings was first issued. The Bench held that the high court erred in holding that limitation was extended due to failure on the part of the Engineer-in-Charge to determine the final amount payable. It was held that if there was such failure, it was for the contractor to have initiated arbitration then and there. Neither was notice issued for arbitration nor was a final bill raised or a request made to determine the total amount payable. The appeal was allowed and order initiating arbitration was set aside. STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. v. M/S B.B.M. ENTERPRISES, CIVIL APPEAL NO.4320/2026, SUPREME COURT – 09 APRIL 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More Law does not favour the indolent April 9, 2026/Read More

Latest News Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ jurisdiction This writ petition challenges a disciplinary order passed by an appellate authority in a statutory appeal under Rule 40 of the Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1976 whereby the appellate authority upheld the findings of misconduct but modified the penalty from “dismissal from service” to “removal from service”. The disciplinary order proceeded on findings relating to (i) tarnishing the image of the organisation (Charge 1), (ii) bringing outside influence (Charge 3) and (iii) bypassing official channels (Charge 4). The Ld. Single Judge emphasised the limits of judicial review and held – “16. …A writ court does not sit as a court of appeal over departmental findings. Interference is warranted where the decision-making process is vitiated by breach of natural justice, patent procedural illegality, perversity, or findings that are unsupported by any evidence. Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lies outside writ review.” and then noted three principal questions that arose for decision – (i) whether the proceedings are vitiated by bias or mala fides; (ii) whether the findings on Charges 1, 3 and 4 suffer from procedural impropriety or absence of evidence. The Ld. Single Judge held –             “A plea of mala fides must be founded on clear particulars and supported by cogent material… The relevant question is whether the authority acted as judge in a matter where personal interest demonstrably displaced institutional decision-making.” and held that this threshold was not met since the penalty was modified indicating that the matter was not foreclosed by a predetermined outcome. In this case, the petitioner’s core defence was that tweets and re-tweets were based on material already in the public domain, were deleted on objection, and represent legitimate whistleblowing and protected speech. The Delhi High Court held – “A public sector employee’s speech rights are not extinguished, but they are mediated through conduct rules that insist on discipline, institutional propriety, and avoidance of conduct prejudicial to the employer’s interests” and further that “The gravamen is the method and platform: the public amplification of allegations of corruption against the organisation, coupled with attempts to mobilise external authorities and media pressure, and a deliberate departure from the prescribed internal route for grievance redressal.”. The Ld. Single Judge held – “26. … In writ review, the question is narrower: whether there was “some evidence” supporting the departmental conclusion, and whether the conclusion is so unreasonable that no rational fact-finder could reach it.” and further –  “31. …the writ court is not divested of jurisdiction to examine proportionality of the penalty. Interference is exceptional and is warranted only where the punishment is so disproportionate to the misconduct proved that it shocks the conscience, in which event the Court may either remit the matter for reconsideration of penalty or, in a rare case, mould relief to shorten litigation.” and finding the penalty to reflect “a manifest imbalance between the misconduct proved and the consequence imposed” interfered on the quantum of penalty but did not disturb the findings on misconduct. The Court remitted the matter to the competent authority to reconsider penalty afresh within six weeks and partly allowed the writ petition. MADANJIT KUMAR v. CENTRAL ELECTRONICS LIMITED, W.P.(C) 13377/2018, DELHI HIGH COURT – 10 FEBRUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More Independent application of mind required by a high court when deciding appeals under s.14A from charges under the SCST Act. February 10, 2026/Read More Once anticipatory bail is granted, it ordinarily continues without fixed expiry unless circumstances change and further cognizable and non bailable… February 9, 2026/Read More