Latest News Slum Dwellers being integral to the larger population of the city would not have any right to breach the fundamental right of others to have clean and hygienic surroundings This case concerns Kanjurmarg Dumping facilities and grievances raised by the citizens in regard to pollution and odour generated from the said dumping facilities and several issues connected therewith, and the issues of rampant littering of domestic waste on public streets in the city of Mumbai A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court observed that “standards of health and hygiene to be maintained by taking measures to prevent roads, streets, lanes and pavements being littered needs to be strictly implemented in all the wards, in every possible manner, including with the Police help”. The advocate for the municipal corporation submitted that slum dwellers who are residents of slum areas, rampantly engage in public nuisance by dumping garbage on the streets, public pavements, etc. The Bench held –             “8. We are of the opinion that those who are habitual to indulge in such reckless actions, they now need to exercise absolute restrain in dumping of such garbage on the public streets. In the event there is any prosecution lodged against such persons or there are fines which are being paid on more than two occasions, this needs to be sufficient and appropriate for the Slum Rehabilitation Authority to consider as to whether the right of such slum dwellers to receive a free of cost / subsidized permanent alternate accommodation needs to be forfeited. The slum dwellers being integral to the larger population of the city would not have any right to breach the fundamental right of others to have a clean and hygienic surroundings.”. The matter is ongoing. KANNAMWAR CO-OP HSG SOC ASSOCIATION LTD. & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS., I.A. (L) NO.3527/2026 IN W.P. NO.790/2018, BOMBAY HIGH COURT – 22 OCTOBER 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Slum Dwellers being integral to the larger population of the city would not have any right to breach the fundamental… October 22, 2026/Read More Free and fair elections are a basic structure of the Constitution of India October 21, 2026/Read More Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More

Latest News Bombay High Court takes suo motu cognizance of loudspeakers and firecrackers aggravating noise and environmental pollution A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court took suo motu cognisance of routine violations of the orders passed, particularly in relation to processions and burning of firecrackers on public streets. Directions had been issued to the municipal corporation and the Maharashtra Pollution Control Board to jointly issue appropriate notices in newspapers, electronic media, social media and other similar means of publicity, informing the public that the burning of firecrackers at public places, including streets, lanes, footpaths shall not be permitted. The Bombay High Court directed the Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, to convene a meeting with all officers-in-charge of Police Stations and bring to their notice the orders passed by it. It further observed that – “An SOP needs to be prepared on actions to be taken in regard to the violations”. The Bench observed held – “6. We have also observed in our earlier orders that, whenever a breach of the provisions of law occurs, appropriate action is required to be taken as the law would mandate, including the imposition of penalties as also initiating prosecution. Any dereliction on the part of the police machinery in this regard, adversely affecting the rights of citizens guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India, shall be viewed seriously in the concerned police officials to be held accountable, if appropriate action is not taken against the erring persons.” The matter is ongoing. IN RE: NOISE AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION; PUBLIC NUISANCE CAUSED BY UNREGULATED USE OF MUSIC SYSTEMS WITH AMPLIFIERS AND FIRECRACKERS ON PUBLIC STREETS DURING FESTIVALS v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS., SUO MOTU PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO. 01 OF 2026, BOMBAY HIGH COURT – 21 OCTOBER 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Slum Dwellers being integral to the larger population of the city would not have any right to breach the fundamental… October 22, 2026/Read More Bombay High Court takes suo motu cognizance of loudspeakers and firecrackers aggravating noise and environmental pollution October 21, 2026/Read More Free and fair elections are a basic structure of the Constitution of India October 21, 2026/Read More

Latest News Free and fair elections are a basic structure of the Constitution of India The petitioner, a registered political party and the principal opposition party in the State of Andhra Pradesh, having failed to secure relief from the High Court eventually moved the Supreme Court stating that there was widespread violence in the State, the election process had been degenerated to a one-sided affair, directions issued by the Election Commission to provide police protection, CCTV coverage at nomination centres etc., were not complied with and contempt notices had been served upon the authorities concerned. It was prayed that the last date for filing nomination as well as declaration of the final list of candidates be extended and further adequate security arrangements be put in place to ensure effective participation in the municipal elections. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh declined relief and one of the grounds was that as the election process had begun and time for submission/filing nomination had already expired, it would be imprudent for the Court to interfere with such election process. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “12. …Free and fair elections are a basic structure of the Constitution. Right to freely participate in such election by filing nomination papers without hindrance is a facet of the free and fair election process. It is a constitutional duty vested on the State Election Commission under Article 243ZA to conduct and supervise Municipal elections in a free and fair manner. Discharge of such duty would necessarily include all steps to ensure unhindered filing of nomination papers by all contesting candidates. The power of the constitutional Courts to exercise judicial review, though deferential in election matters, cannot be said to be wholly negated when the discharge of such constitutional duty of the State Election Commission is hampered due to widespread violence impairing peace and tranquility and thereby skewing a level playing field in filing nominations.” The Bench reiterated judicial pronouncements on the subject and held – “16. These authorities above unequivocally state while constitutional courts would ordinarily not interfere with election process, but their hands are not tied when appropriate interventions are necessary to ensure that elections are conducted in a free and fair manner and are not marred by extra constitutional or illegal means, for eg. muscle power.”. The Bench holding that the Petitioner had made out a case passed certain directions – (i)  the State Election Commission shall postpone the publication of the final list of candidates till 25.10.2026, the State Election Commission shall consider the representations made by petitioner party and/or various candidates, including evidentiary material as well as electronic evidence placed before it and take a decision to extend the last date of filing nominations in urban local bodies wherever it is of the view that candidates were unable to file their nominations due to law and order situation. (ii) The Commission shall also make additional arrangements to file nominations at the District Headquarters before the District Collector, wherever necessary. (iii) The State Election Commission shall take all necessary steps to remove apprehensions from the mind of the petitioner and prospective candidates that they have a free and fair chance of participating in the election by filing their nominations. The Election Commission shall submit its compliance report. (iv) The Director General of Police shall take all necessary steps to maintain police bandobast, CCTV coverage at nomination centers and provide necessary protection to candidates who would come to the centres concerned to file their nominations, and file compliance report. The matter is ongoing. YUVAJANA SRAMIKA RYTHU CONGRESS PARTY v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH & ORS., SLP(C) NO. 37476/2026, SUPREME COURT – 21 OCTOBER 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Free and fair elections are a basic structure of the Constitution of India October 21, 2026/Read More Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More What is ‘own wrong’ to attract the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) HMA August 18, 2026/Read More

Latest News Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same or substantially similar allegations on the doctrine of res judicata. This case concerns a criminal appeal that challenged an order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, rejecting the appellant’s petition seeking quashing of proceedings emanating from an F.I.R registered in 2024. The question that arose for consideration was whether the High Court was justified in declining to quash the FIR and proceedings arising therefrom, despite rejection by the magistrate of an application u/s.156(3) of the Cr.PC founded on substantially the same allegations. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “Sections 154, 156(3) and 190 disclose a graded statutory scheme, the ordinary and primary recourse of an informant lies with the Police under Section 154 Cr.PC, recourse to the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is a step properly taken where that primary recourse has failed or been refused and cognizance under Section 190 is a distinct and subsequent stage, triggered by any of the three contingencies noted above, and not confined to a police report consequent upon a Section 173 of the Cr.PC direction alone.” and further held – “The jurisdiction under Section 156(3), therefore, is confined to directing investigation… The question which therefore arises is whether rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same or substantially similar allegations by operation of the doctrine of res judicata.” The Bench answered this in the negative and held – “the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC, being an order rendered at the threshold without any adjudication on the merits after trial, cannot be accorded such finality as would attract the doctrine of res judicata so as to bar the subsequent registration of an FIR or the continuation of criminal proceedings founded upon the same or substantially similar allegations” and “cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC”. The Bench further reiterated the principles of exercising jurisdiction u/s.482 – “the Court is concerned only with whether the allegations contained in the FIR, taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. At that stage, the Court does not embark upon an enquiry into the correctness, reliability or probative value of the material relied upon by either side.”. The Bench observed that allegations in the FIR unquestionably disclosed the commission of cognizable offences warranting investigation and accordingly dismissed the appeal. PRAMOD KUMAR SHUKLA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS., CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.3931/2026, SUPREME COURT – 19 AUGUST 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More

Latest News What is ‘own wrong’ to attract the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) HMA. This case concerns an appeal u/s.19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 assailing the Judgment and Decree of a Principal Judge, Family Courts, Delhi whereby the divorce petition filed by the husband u/ss.13(1A) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”) was dismissed. The primary contention raised by the husband was that there was no valid marriage between the parties, though matrimonial ceremonies were conducted, the husband was under the influence of a sedative substance at that time rendering the marriage voidable and the parties had been living separately for a number of years. The wife contended that she was always willing to rejoin the company of the husband but the husband deserted her without sufficient cause and reason, and she filed a petition for restitution of conjugal rights. A Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that s.5 HMA provides for essential conditions for a valid Hindu Marriage, the contravention of which results in a marriage being void as per s.11 and the husband’s case does not relate to contravention of any stipulated conditions. His allegations of being under the influence of a sedative substance could make the marriage voidable for which a petition for annulment had to be presented within one year of discovery. The Bench further held that the dispute about the validity of marriage was challenged by the husband in the wife’s petition for restitution of conjugal rights, and the issue was decided against him and had attained finality. The Bench further held –             “after passing of a decree of judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights, when the parties fail to resume cohabitation for a period of one year or more, a decree of divorce could be granted at the instance of either of the parties… the Court is empowered to examine the conduct of the party seeking divorce and if it finds that the relief is being sought on the basis of the petitioner’s own wrongdoing, the Court may refuse to grant such relief”. It was further held –             “On one hand, he disputed the validity of the marriage itself and on the other hand, he sought dissolution of the very same marriage under the garb of Sections 13(1)(ib) and 13(1A) of the HMA. A party cannot approbate and reprobate simultaneously, i.e., disputing the factum of marriage while simultaneously praying for its dissolution under the HMA. Therefore, the said conduct of the appellant evidently falls in the category of ‘own wrong’ and is sufficient to attract the provision of Section 23(1)(a) HMA. Whereas, no positive act has been committed by the respondent to create a situation so as to make it impossible for the appellant to resume cohabitation.”. The appeal was dismissed. X v. Y, MAT. APP. (F.C.) 252/2018, DELHI HIGH COURT – 18 AUGUST 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More What is ‘own wrong’ to attract the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) HMA August 18, 2026/Read More Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News What is a First Degree for admission to 3-year LL.B. course in India. This case concerned a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging a communication of the University cancelling the provisional admission of the Petitioner to the 3-year LL.B. course on the ground that his degree was obtained from a London University and did not constitute a qualifying ‘First Degree’ for seeking admission to the 3-year LL.B. course in India. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court considered the provisions of the Advocates Act, 1961; the Rules of Legal Education, 2008 and the BCI Notification of 26th August 2020 to arrive at its conclusion. The Bench considered the Rules and held –             “The provisions thus consistently contemplate a sequence – an applicant must first possess a qualifying graduation-level qualification and thereafter pursue the three-year degree course in law. This is not merely a requirement as to the nomenclature of the qualification. It reflects the very structure of the three-year LL.B. course as a second-stage professional law degree.”  It further held –             “We therefore find that the Petitioner’s foreign undergraduate law degree, merely by reason of its recognition by the BCI for the purposes contemplated under the applicable regulatory framework, cannot be treated as the antecedent ‘First Degree’ required under Rules 2(xxxi), 4(a) and 5(a) for admission to the three-year LL.B. course in India.”. The Bench also considered the Petitioner’s grievance that the University, after granting provisional admission and accepting tuition fees, cancelled the admission by a brief communication without issuing a show cause notice, assigning reasons or affording an opportunity of hearing. The Bench then held –             “A provisional admission or acceptance of tuition fees cannot confer an entitlement contrary to the governing statutory framework”. The writ petition was dismissed and it was recorded –             “…we hold that the Petitioner’s three-year undergraduate law degree obtained from Queen Mary University of London cannot, merely by reason of its recognition by the BCI for the purposes contemplated under the regulatory framework governing foreign law degrees, be treated as the qualifying ‘First Degree’ for admission to the three-year LL.B. course in India. The BCI Notification dated 26th August 2020 does not lead to a different conclusion.”. YOHAAN ABRAHAM v. CHHATRAPATI SHIVAJI MAHARAJ UNIVERSITY & BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA, W.P. No.4739/2026, BOMBAY HIGH COURT – 14 AUGUST 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Whether rejection of an application u/s.156(3) Cr.P.C. attains such finality as to preclude subsequent criminal proceedings founded on the same… August 19, 2026/Read More What is ‘own wrong’ to attract the provisions of Section 23(1)(a) HMA August 18, 2026/Read More What is a First Degree for admission to 3-year LL.B. course in India August 14, 2026/Read More

Latest News Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later agreement. The dispute arose from a redevelopment project involving Hirani Developers and members of a housing society. The original development agreement of 2011 contained an arbitration clause. Subsequently, individual society members entered into permanent alternate accommodation agreements with the developer in 2023 and 2024 regarding accommodation arrangements during redevelopment. These later agreements did not contain a separate arbitration clause, however clause 14 provided that all terms and conditions of the earlier development agreement shall be construed to form a part of the agreements and all clauses thereof would be binding on the parties. Subsequently, disputes arose between the parties and some members approached the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019. The developer invoked arbitration and issued notices seeking the appointment of an arbitrator. The respondents refused, arguing that no arbitration agreement existed between the developer and individual members. The Bombay High Court accepted the argument and dismissed applications filed u/s. 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Againat that order, the developer approached the Supreme Court. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court cited s.7(5) and held – “8. Section 7 of the Arbitration Act is titled ‘Arbitration agreement’. Section 7(5) therein provides that the reference in a contract to a document containing an arbitration clause would constitute an arbitration agreement if the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that arbitration clause part of the contract.” Referring to clause 14, the Bench further held –             “12. This was, thus, not a case of mere reference to an earlier agreement but a case where the parties to the later contract clearly intended to import the Development Agreement, body and soul, into the later agreements. Therefore, there can be no doubt as to the incorporation of Clause 36 of the Development Agreement, i.e., the arbitration clause, into the Permanent Alternate Accommodation Agreements. Viewed thus, the High Court was in error in its understanding of the legal position obtaining under Section 7(5) of the Arbitration Act, as explained by this Court in the aforestated decisions. This was a fit case for the High Court to have accepted the plea of the appellant that there was an arbitration agreement between the parties by incorporation.” and set aside the impugned order, allowed the appeal and appointed a sole arbitrator to resolve the disputes and differences between the appellant and the respondent members. HIRANI DEVELOPERS v. NEHRU NAGAR SAMRUDDHI CHS LTD. & ANR. ETC., SLP (C) Nos. 38407-38411 of 2025, SUPREME COURT – 13 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenges the findings of the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court-II whereby the labour court allowed the travel allowance claim of the workman filed u/s.33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The dispute centres on whether the workman remained entitled to payments of travel allowance / dearness allowance/ conveyance after cessation of employment. The Delhi High Court held – “11. … it is apposite to observe that the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, while examining an Award passed by the Labour Court, is supervisory in nature and circumscribed in scope. It is well settled that the High Court does not act as an appellate authority over the findings returned by the Labour Court. Interference is warranted only where the Award suffers from patent illegality, perversity, jurisdictional error, or where material evidence has been ignored. … The award of the Labour Court can be set aside only if there is an error apparent on the face of the record.” With respect to the filing of an application u/s.33C(2), it was held – “the power conferred by Section 33C(2) is one of computation and recovery and not of adjudication. Where the very foundation of the claim is in dispute, the workman must first have his entitlement recognised by the appropriate forum, and only thereafter may he invoke Section 33C(2) for the purpose of computing and recovering the benefit so recognised.” The Ld. Single Judge held that the application u/s.33C(2) was not maintainable. It was held –             “33. Thus, the present case exemplifies a situation where the Labour Court has effectively assumed jurisdiction to adjudicate a disputed industrial claim under the guise of computation, thereby transgressing the statutory limits of Section 33C(2). Such an approach not only runs contrary to settled law but also undermines the carefully structured scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act, which delineates distinct forums and procedures for adjudication and execution. In the absence of any prior adjudication, award, settlement, or statutory provision recognising the claimed right, the Respondent’s claim was not one of computation simpliciter, but one requiring foundational adjudication.” The writ petition was allowed, the findings of the labour court were quashed and set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and the claim of the workman u/s.33C(2) was dismissed as not maintainable. ALLAHABAD BANK v. R.S. SAINI, W.P.(C) 7096/2007, DELHI HIGH COURT – 12 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More

Latest News Situs of employment and place where termination takes effect are determinative factors for identifying the “appropriate Government” in industrial disputes. The writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the workman challenged a labour court award whereby it was held that the Government of NCT of Delhi was not the “appropriate Government” for making the reference and consequently the claim of the workman was held to be not maintainable. A Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held – “Courts have consistently held that the jurisdiction of a Labour Court to adjudicate an industrial dispute must have a direct and substantial nexus with the territory of the Government making the reference. The expression “appropriate Government” as defined under Section 2(a) of the Act contemplates the Government having jurisdiction over the industry or establishment in relation to which the dispute substantially arises. It is in this context that the situs of employment assumes significance.” and further held – “32. The legal position governing the present controversy is now fairly well settled. In disputes arising out of termination of service, it is ordinarily the place where the workman was lastly employed and where the alleged termination took effect that constitutes the determinative factor for deciding territorial jurisdiction. The principle is founded upon the rationale that the industrial dispute substantially crystallises at the place where the employment subsisted and where the adverse employment action operated against the workman.” The Delhi High Court observed that once the workman himself admitted that he was discharging duties at Faridabad, Haryana on the date of alleged termination, the labour court cannot be faulted for holding that the industrial dispute substantially arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the State of Haryana and held – “40. An admission made in pleadings is a judicial admission of the highest order. It is well settled that a party is bound by its pleadings and ordinarily cannot be permitted to travel beyond the same in an attempt to improve or alter the nature of their case.” The Ld. Single Judge held that the impugned award did not suffer from perversity or patent illegality or jurisdictional infirmity warranting interference under Article 226, the impugned award was upheld and the writ petition was dismissed. It was however clarified that dismissal of the writ petition shall not preclude the workman from availing remedies available in law before the appropriate forum and the appropriate Government having jurisdiction, and if not otherwise barred by law. RAJESHWAR DAYAL AGGARWAL v. M/S ENICAR MACHINE (INDIA), W.P.(C) 9849/2016, DELHI HIGH COURT – 11 MAY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Arbitration clause gets incorporated in later agreement if the previous agreement containing the arbitration clause is imported in the later… May 13, 2026/Read More Claims requiring foundational adjudication and not one of computation simpliciter cannot be decided under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes… May 12, 2026/Read More Situs of employment and place where termination takes effect are determinative factors for identifying the “appropriate Government” in industrial disputes. May 11, 2026/Read More

Latest News upreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage This appeal arises from a matrimonial dispute between the parties which resulted in a settlement arrived at during mediation. However, the respondent-wife resiled from the same, withdrew her consent for the mutual divorce at the time of second motion and instituted proceedings under The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”). The husband-petitioner filed a quashing petition. The high court in the quashing petition passed an interim order issuing notice, and agreed to continue the D.V. proceedings directing the respondent-wife to deposit a certain amount and retain the jewellery received by her in terms of the settlement agreement. Aggrieved by the order, the appellant-husband filed an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and an application seeking decree of divorce under Article 142(1) of the Constitution of India. The following issues arose for consideration – (1) Whether proceedings under the DV Act should be quashed? (2) Whether any party can back out from a settlement arrived at in mediation proceedings? If yes, in what situation? (3) Whether the Supreme Court can exercise its powers under Article 142(1) to grant a decree of divorce to the parties on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and if yes, on what terms and conditions? A 2-Judges bench of the Supreme Court held on Issues (1) and (2) – “30. It is trite law that once the parties have entered into a settlement agreement which was duly authenticated by the mediator, in case of any resilement from such terms as agreed upon in the settlement, the resiling party must be encumbered with heavy costs. Any deviation from the terms of the settlement arrived in mediation and later confirmed by the Court should be dealt with strictly as such deviation harbors an attack to the foundational basis of the entire process of mediation. … The exception to the above rule is that a party can resile from the Settlement Agreement arrived in the mediation proceedings is, if it successfully demonstrates that the said Settlement Agreement was procured by force, fraud or undue influence. The party can also resile from the Settlement Agreement on account of non-fulfillment of any of the conditions by the opposite party as set out in the Settlement Agreement.” and observed that they were not impressed by the reasons given by the respondent-wife for resiling out of the settlement agreement, there were no specific allegations regarding any sort of domestic violence that could emanate from the pleadings and thus quashed the proceedings under the DV Act holding that “the continuance of which would be an abuse of the process of law”. On Issue (3) after referring to a catena of judgments and observing that the jurisprudence pertaining to the grant of divorce under Article 142(1) on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has been developed with caution through various judgments, the Bench held – “49. A perusal of the dicta laid down by this Court in the above mentioned judgments and several others holding authority on the said law point makes it crystal clear that the Court while exercising its power under Article 142(1) for grant of divorce has to first conclude that there has been an irretrievable breakdown of marriage.” and concluded on the basis of materials and conduct of the parties that this was a fit case for exercise of powers under Article 142(1) to grant a divorce as there had been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage. The Bench further passed directions. DHANANJAY RATHI v. RUCHIKA RATHI, CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1924/2026, SUPREME COURT – 13 APRIL 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Supreme Court should exercise caution and consider jurisprudence developed through various judgments while granting divorce under Article 142(1) of the… April 13, 2026/Read More Power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to interdict investigation is to… April 13, 2026/Read More Re-appreciation of evidence, reassessment of comparative credibility, or substitution of a preferred factual inference lie outside the purview of writ… February 10, 2026/Read More