Latest News Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of evidence These appeals arose out of a judgment and order passed by the Division Bench of the High Court at Calcutta whereby the High Court directed demolition of a building constructed by the appellant on a plot of land admeasuring 0.39 acres, near the Visva-Bharati University, and also directed it to pay compensation of Rs.10,00,000/-, which was to be used for the purpose of restoration and preservation of the area in question, and costs of Rs.25,000/- to be paid to the petitioners. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court observed that even if there was any infirmity in the timing or manner of conversion of the subject plot, such infirmity could not have the effect of invalidating the entire construction- “34. …At best, such an infirmity would warrant regulatory scrutiny or corrective measures in accordance with law. It would not, however, justify the extreme consequence of demolition of a completed structure, particularly when the land was earmarked for “residential use” as per the Land Use and Development Control Plan, 2002 and the conversion was subsequently approved by the competent authority and no statutory provision mandated demolition as an automatic or inevitable consequence of such a defect.”. The Bench held – “52. Equally significant is the principle governing the exercise of jurisdiction in public interest litigation (PIL). While writ jurisdiction serves an important constitutional purpose, the burden squarely lies on the writ petitioners to place clear, cogent, and reliable material on record in support of the allegations made. Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must remain circumspect while entertaining petitions that hinge upon disputed questions of fact, particularly where such disputes require detailed examination of evidence or adjudication of rival factual claims. Public interest litigation cannot be permitted to become a vehicle for selective or targeted challenges, nor can it be invoked to resolve contested factual issues which are not capable of determination on affidavits alone.” The appeal was allowed and the judgment of the High Court was set aside. M/S AARSUDAY PROJECTS & INFRASTRUCTURE (P) LTD v. JOGEN CHOWDHURY & ORS., CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2920 OF 2018, SUPREME COURT – 29 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural January 9, 2026/Read More In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration January 9, 2026/Read More

Latest News Supreme court to settle conflicting decisions regarding interpretation of the words “due date” in Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 This appeal arises out of an impugned final judgment and order of September 2025 in an income tax appeal passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court took note of the conflicting opinions after recording the findings of the High Court to the effect –  Employer’s contributions under Section 36(1)(iv) and employees’ contributions covered under Section 36(1)(va) read with Section 2(24)(x) are fundamentally different in nature and must be treated separately. Employees’ contribution deducted from their salaries are deemed to be income under Section 2(24)(x) and are held in trust by the employer. The employers can claim deduction only if they deposit these amounts on or before the statutory due date under Section 36(1)(va).  The non-obstante clause in Section 43B cannot be applied to employees’ contributions governed by Section 36(1)(va). Alom Extrusions (supra) has been distinguished as the same has not considered Sections 2(24)(x) and 36(1)(va). Explanation 5 to Section 43B was not considered at all while arriving at the decision that employees’ contribution must be deposited on or before the due dates under relevant statutes.” For ease of reference, section 36(1)(va) is reproduced below – “36. (1) The deductions provided for in the following clauses shall be allowed in respect of the matters dealt with therein, in computing the income referred to in section 28— … (va) any sum received by the assessee from any of his employees to which the provisions of sub-clause (x) of clause (24) of section 2 apply, if such sum is credited by the assessee to the employee’s account in the relevant fund or funds on or before the due date. [Explanation 1].—For the purposes of this clause, “due date” means the date by which the assessee is required as an employer to credit an employee’s contribution to the employee’s account in the relevant fund under any Act, rule, order or notification issued thereunder or under any standing order, award, contract of service or otherwise. [Explanation 2.—For the removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the provisions of section 43B shall not apply and shall be deemed never to have been applied for the purposes of determining the “due date” under this clause;]” The Bench recorded that there were two School of thoughts as regards the interpretation of the words “due date” – (1) due date specified under the relevant PF, ESI Act and (2) due date of filling of return under Section 139(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Bench said that it “would like to look into this issue” and issued notice returnable in four weeks. WOODLAND (AERO CLUB) PRIVATE LIMITED DIRECTOR v. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, SLP (C) NO.1532/2026, SUPREME COURT – 27 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Courts exercising writ jurisdiction must be cautious while entertaining petitions hinged upon disputed questions of fact requiring detailed examination of… January 29, 2026/Read More Supreme court to settle conflicting decisions regarding interpretation of the words “due date” in Section 36(1)(va) of the Income Tax… January 27, 2026/Read More Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural January 9, 2026/Read More

Latest News Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural This case concerned a revision petition filed by a landlord against the order of the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi (“ARC”) dismissing his eviction petition citing bona fide requirement. The ARC had also granted leave to defend to the tenant. The Ld. Single Judge of the Delhi High Court held – “18. Further, no doubt, as held in Shiv Sarup Gupta (supra) the landlord is the best judge of his needs, it has also been held therein that the need urged by the landlord must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural, and the like. In fact, as also held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sarvate T. B. v. Nemichand [1966 MP LJ 26 (S.C.)] and Dattatraya Laxman Kamble v. Abdul Rasul Moulali Kotkunde [(1999) 4 SCC 1], should there arise any suspicion/ doubt in the mind of the Court as to the genuineness of the bona fide requirement urged by the landlord, the burden is upon the landlord to clear all such doubts. Clearly, the landlord herein has not been able to discharge the said burden.”. The revision petition was dismissed holding that there were contradictions, non-filing of requisite documents by the landlord and no proper evidence led by the landlord to prove his case, citing Sarla Ahuja vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(1998) 8 SCC 119] and Abid-Ul-Islam vs. Inder Sain Dua [(2022) 6 SCC 30]. The Delhi High Court did not interfere with the findings of the ARC stating that in revisional jurisdiction, the scope is itself limited. SH. SANKET BEHARI MITTAL v. SH. SUBHASH CHAND GUPTA, RC.REV. 589/2019, DELHI HIGH COURT – 09 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Bona fide need urged by landlord for tenant eviction must be genuine, sincere, honest, natural January 9, 2026/Read More In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration January 9, 2026/Read More Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the… January 8, 2026/Read More

Latest News In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration The short issue which arose for consideration in this appeal was whether the Family Court committed any jurisdictional error or material irregularity in modifying the interim visitation arrangement, by reducing the extent and frequency of visitation, in exercise of its discretionary powers, keeping in view the welfare of the minor daughter as the paramount consideration? A 2-Judges Bench of the Delhi High Court held – “11. … It is well settled that, in matters concerning custody and visitation, the welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration, overriding all other considerations, including the convenience or preference of either parent. The Court must ensure that the child’s physical safety, emotional well-being, and opportunities for healthy development are safeguarded, while promoting meaningful contact with both parents wherever possible. Any modification of visitation rights must, therefore, be guided by evidence demonstrating a clear need for change in order to protect the child’s welfare, rather than on speculative or minor disputes between the parents.”. The Bench further held – “15. … It is well settled that the power to modify visitation arrangements is not to be exercised merely on considerations of convenience or routine parental disagreement, but only where circumstances are demonstrated to have a material impact on the welfare of the child. In assessing the competing contentions, this Court recognizes that while a parent is entitled to regular and meaningful visitation, such interaction must not expose the child to circumstances likely to cause physical harm, emotional distress, or psychological instability.”. The Bench also noted that approximately twenty litigations were pending between the parties and their respective family members – “19. …reflecting the acrimonious nature of their relationship. Such multiplicity of proceedings demonstrates that the marital discord has translated into prolonged adversarial litigation. While each party asserts its legal rights, this Court cannot be unmindful of the fact that sustained inter se conflict between parents has a direct bearing on the emotional and psychological well-being of a minor child, particularly one of tender age. During the formative years, a child requires stability, emotional security, and an environment insulated, as far as possible, from parental discord. The Courts exercising jurisdiction in custody and visitation matters are therefore duty-bound to ensure that the child does not become a casualty of ongoing disputes between the parents.”. The Bench found no perversity, jurisdictional error, or material irregularity in the exercise of discretion by the Family Court and dismissed the appellant father’s appeal holding – “20. …It is well settled that an appellate court ought not to substitute its own view for that of the court of first instance in matters of discretionary interim arrangements, unless the decision is shown to be manifestly arbitrary or contrary to the welfare of the child, which is not the case herein. Moreover, only interim arrangement for visitation has been made which is open to modification, change and, increased if circumstances permit.”. JAGMEET CHOPRA v. BASANT SAWHNEY, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 433/2025, DELHI HIGH COURT – 09 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit In matters concerning custody and visitation, welfare of the minor child is the paramount consideration January 9, 2026/Read More Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the… January 8, 2026/Read More Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent December 17, 2025/Read More

Latest News Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 This appeal concerned criminal complaints filed under s.138 read with ss. 141 & 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in respect of dishonour of cheques. The issues that arose for consideration were: (a) Whether the High Court was right in quashing a complaint case and consequential summoning order against Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 arising out of the dishonour of the firm’s cheque, on the ground that it related to the same underlying liability for which another complaint case had already been instituted and whether it did not amount to a ‘mini trial’ prohibited u/s.482 of the Cr.PC; and b) Whether the High Court erred in not quashing the criminal proceedings against Respondent No.2 arising out of 3 complaint cases filed against him. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court referred to settled legal principles that govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s.482 of the Cr.PC and held – “26. … This Court in catena of judgments has emphasised that the High Court must avoid usurping the function of a Trial Court or conducting a mini trial when disputed factual questions attend the maintainability of a complaint. In a much recent decision of this Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited vs. State of Maharashtra and Others [(2021) 19 SCC 401], a three-Judge Bench had held that the power to quash criminal proceedings must be exercised sparingly, and only where the complaint, even if accepted in full, discloses no offence or continuation would amount to abuse of process of law.” and referred to the directions to the High Courts to be kept in mind while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Cr.PC. The Bench further held – “28. On these lines, it is apt clear that even though the powers under Section 482 of the Cr.PC are very wide, its conferment requires the High Court to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any complaint or FIR, the High Page Court exercising its power under this provision cannot go embarking upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not.”. The Bench held that a separate cause of action arises upon each dishonour of a cheque provided the statutory sequence of presentation, dishonour, notice, and failure to pay is complete. The fact that multiple cheques arise from one transaction will not merge them into a single cause of action. However, the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court u/s.482 of the Cr.PC cannot be used to decide disputed issues. The Supreme Court held that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction and was not justified in quashing the complaint case and summoning order. For the second issue, the Supreme Court referred to the decision in Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. vs. Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Others [(2000) 2 SCC 745], wherein a Division Bench of the Supreme Court had highlighted the ingredients which are to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the NI Act and held that the High Court was justified in not quashing the complaint cases against Respondent No. 2 because they prima facie disclosed ingredients of the offence u/s.138 NI Act. SUMIT BANSAL v. M/S MGI DEVELOPERS AND PROMOTERS & ANR., CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 141/2026, SUPREME COURT – 08 JANUARY 2026. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Exercise of inherent jurisdiction of high court and ingredients to be satisfied for making out a case u/s.138 of the… January 12, 2026/Read More Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent December 17, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 17, 2025/Read More  

Latest News Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent. The reference arose from a judgment rendered by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court concerning the timeline prescribed for the presentation of a petition for divorce by mutual consent under section 13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”). In light of the divergent opinion of the Division Bench, it formulated specific questions of law and requested Hon‘ble the Chief Justice to place the matter before a Full Bench for authoritative determination. The legal questions referred to the Full Bench read as follows: (a)   Whether a petition u/s.13B(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act can be filed by the parties before completing the period of separation of one year?; (b)   If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative, whether the period of six months between the presentation of the First Motion u/s.13B(1) and the Second Motion u/s.13B(2), can be waived off by a court even though the parties have not been living separately for more than one year on the date when such waiver is prayed for? The 3-Judges Bench of the Delhi High Court considered various decisions of the Supreme Court considered Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 and recorded – “23. It is in the foregoing context that we must consider four aspects: First, whether the Family Court and the High Court can completely waive the 01-year period stipulated under section 13B(1) of the HMA, by allowing parties to present the first motion even before they have lived separately for at least 01-year, by invoking the proviso to section 14(1) of the HMA. Second, whether such waiver should be permitted only in cases of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent as contemplated in the proviso to section 14(1). Third, in a case where the 01-year period under section 13B(1) is waived, can the Family Court and the High Court also waive the 06-month cooling-off period stipulated under section 13B(2) of the HMA. Fourth, having waived the 01-year period under section 13B(1) and the 06-month period under section 13B(2) of the HMA, can the court allow the second motion and grant a decree of divorce by mutual consent that is effective forthwith, or, can the second motion be allowed and the divorce decree granted only after expiration of the 01-year separation period stipulated under section 13B(1).”. The Bench summarised its conclusions as under – “57.1. The statutory period of 01-year prescribed under section 13B(1) of the HMA as a pre-requisite for presenting the first motion, can be waived, by applying the proviso to section 14(1) of the HMA; 57.2. The waiver of the 01-year separation period under section 13B(1) of the HMA does not preclude waiver of the 06-month cooling-off period for filing the second motion under section 13B(2); and waiver of the 01-year period under section 13B(1), and the 06-month period under section 13B(2), are to be considered independently of each other; 57.3. Where the court is satisfied that the 01-year period under section 13B(1) and the 06-month period under section 13B(2) of the HMA deserve to be waived, the court is not legally mandated to defer the date from which the divorce decree would take effect, and such decree may be made effective forthwith; 57.4. Such waiver is not to be granted merely for the asking but only upon the court being satisfied that circumstances of ―exceptional hardship to the petitioner‖ and/or ―exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent‖ exist, while also testing the case on the anvil of the considerations set-out in Pooja Gupta; 57.5. Waiver, as above, can be granted both by the Family Court as well as the High Court; and 57.6. As contemplated in the proviso to section 14(1) of the HMA, where a court finds that the waiver of the 01-year period under section 13B(1) has been obtained by misrepresentation or concealment, the court may defer the date on which the divorce would take effect, as may be considered appropriate; or may dismiss the divorce petition, at whichever stage it is pending, without prejudice to the right of the parties to present a fresh petition under section 13B(1) of the HMA after expiration of the 01-year period, on the same or substantially the same facts as may have been pleaded in the petition so dismissed. The reference was answered in these terms SHIKSHA KUMARI v. SANTOSH KUMAR, MAT.APP.(F.C.) 111/2025, DELHI HIGH COURT – 3 JUDGES BENCH – 17 DECEMBER 2025. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent December 18, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 17, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 9, 2025/Read More  

Latest News Whether a member of a consortium can itself invoke Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Two civil appeals were filed against an order passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad u/s. 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 constituting an Arbitral Tribunal (AT) for resolution of dispute as per the arbitration clause 22.2 in General Conditions of Contract. The contest was on the ground that the first respondent, being one of the members of the Consortium, could not have invoked arbitration in its individual capacity. The question that arose was whether a member of a consortium can itself invoke Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A 2-Judges bench of the Supreme Court held – “16. … Answer to that question will necessarily depend on enquiry into the terms of the principal contract, as well as the Consortium Agreement. The specific terms of the Consortium Agreement, parties to that agreement, and the nature of the rights and mutual obligations that the agreement creates will have to be examined in detail. Reference court will, however, confine its enquiry only to a prima facie satisfaction as to whether a member of a consortium qualifies as a “party” to the arbitration agreement. This prima facie satisfaction is sufficient for the referral court to constitute and refer the dispute to the AT. Thereafter, it is for the AT to undertake the detailed enquiry as to whether a member of the consortium is in fact a veritable party to the arbitration agreement or not.”. The Bench further held – “Beyond the prima facie enquiry, it should be the discipline of the referral court to refrain from undertaking a detailed enquiry on basis of evidence to arrive at a finding of fact in the nature of a ‘proof’.”. It was held – “19. …Whether first respondent has validly invoked arbitration individually, whether the Consortium continues to exist, whether consent of other Consortium partners was necessary, and whether claims are maintainable after commencement of liquidation, are all matters which may legitimately be raised, contested and determined before the AT under Section 16. Entertaining these questions here amount to conducting a mini trial at the Section 11 stage, contrary to the settled principles of minimal judicial intervention and kompetenz kompetenz.” The Bench opined that the High Court had not committed any error in constituting the AT in exercise of its powers under Sections 11(6) and 11(6-A) of the 1996 Act and the AT was directed to consider all questions including preliminary objections relating to maintainability of the arbitration on merits. The petitions were dismissed. M/S ANDHRA PRADESH POWER GENERATION CORPORATION LIMITED (APGENCO) v. M/S TECPRO SYSTEMS LIMITED & ORS., SLP (C) NOS. 8998/2023 & 13200/2023, SUPREME COURT – 17 DECEMBER 2025. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 18, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 9, 2025/Read More Employee in not less than five years of service entitled to payment of gratuity, regardless of retirement or resignation from… December 9, 2025/Read More  

Latest News If loss Is caused by fire, cause of fire becomes immaterial – insurance claim allowed. This appeal arose out of an insurance claim that was rejected on the ground that though the loss was caused by fire, insurer’s liability would not attach as the cause fell under the exclusion clause of the policy (“Standard Fire and Special Perils Insurance Policy”). A theft had taken place on the factory premises which preceded the fire. Being aggrieved by the repudiation of its claim, the Appellant filed a complaint before the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC). The NCDRC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the proximate cause of the loss was burglary and the insurance policy taken by the Appellant did not cover the loss on account of theft/ burglary. Aggrieved, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “20. … From the bare reading of the opening paragraph of the policy, it is clear that the Respondent had assured to indemnify the loss to the insured by any of the perils specified in the policy.”. Fire was the first peril set out in the policy, certain exclusions were also mentioned therein. The Bench held that burglary/theft was not included in the exclusion given in the specified peril “Fire.”. It was held – “20. …Once it is not disputed that the loss is caused by fire, then the cause igniting the fire becomes immaterial. The insurer cannot refuse to indemnify the damage caused by fire, which is a specified peril, on the ground that the proximate cause of fire was burglary/theft (which is excluded under the RSMD clause), particularly when no such exclusion is provided in the specified peril “Fire”. Further, if we look into the general exclusion in the policy, loss by theft is excluded during or after the occurrence of the insured peril except as provided under the RSMD clause. Nonetheless, the policy is silent on the aspect of whether the burglary/ theft which precedes the insured peril is excluded or not. The Respondent has repudiated the claim of the Appellant on the ground that since the theft preceded the fire, the claim for loss by the Appellant is not maintainable because under the RSMD clause, burglary/theft is an exclusion. The NCDRC had also upheld the said stand of the Respondent, however, in our considered view, the reason for repudiation of the claim of the Appellant is not justified.”. The Bench reiterated the decision in Orion Conmerx Pvt. Ltd. vs. National insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine 2309 and held “it is a settled position that if the damage is caused by fire, then the reason by which the fire took place becomes irrelevant” and “in case of insurance contracts, the exclusion clause must be construed strictly and wherever there is any ambiguity between two or more clauses in the contract, it must be interpreted in favour of the insured”. It was further held –             “28. … It is a trite law that the exclusions in the contract for insurance must be read strictly and, therefore, the exclusion provided under the RSMD clause would not oust the liability of the insurer when the loss or damage is attributable to the peril of fire which has its independent exclusions.”. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the repudiation and NCDRC judgment and remitted the matter to the NCDRC to assess the loss pursuant to the claim filed by the Appellant. CEMENT CORPORATION OF INDIA v. ICICI LOMBARD GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, CIVIL APPEAL NO.2052/2016, SUPREME COURT – 16 DECEMBER 2025. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit If loss Is caused by fire, cause of fire becomes immaterial – insurance claim allowed December 18, 2025/Read More Section 13B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and timelines for petitions for divorce by mutual consent December 17, 2025/Read More Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 17, 2025/Read More  

Latest News Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition. This appeal was against a judgment passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in a commercial arbitration application whereby the Section 11(4)-Application filed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 of the respondent-BCL Secure Premises Pvt. Ltd. was allowed and an arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate upon the disputes and differences between the parties. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court held – “24. The scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11-Petition when faced with an issue of joinder of a non-signatory to the arbitration agreement has been lucidly set out by the five-judge Bench of this Court in Cox and Kings Limited vs. Sap India Private Limited and Another [(2024) 4 SCC 1]” and further – “…the referral court should be prima facie satisfied that there exists an arbitration agreement and as to whether the non-signatory is a veritable party. It further holds that even if the referral court prima facie arrives at the satisfaction that the non signatory is a veritable party, the Arbitral Tribunal is not denuded of its jurisdiction to decide whether the non signatory is indeed a party to the arbitration agreement on the basis of factual evidence and application of legal doctrine. The Court further reinforces this proposition by holding that as to whether the non-signatory is bound would be for the Arbitral Tribunal to decide. But what is primordial is that it should be demonstrated prima facie before the referral court that the non-signatory is a veritable party. According to the “Illustrated Oxford Dictionary (Revised Edition 2003)” the word: “veritable” means “real; rightly so called” (a veritable feast)”, In substance, it means truly, genuinely or for all intended purposes. The referral court under Section 11 is not deprived of its jurisdiction from examining whether the non-signatory is in the real sense a party to the arbitration agreement. The answer thereof will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case after examining the documents pertaining thereto.”. The Bench further held – “35. This does not mean that where the Referral Court finds prima facie a party is not a veritable party still the matter is left to the Arbitral Tribunal. To hold so, would relegate the Referral Court to the status of a monotonous automation. Further, to countenance such an extreme proposition would lead to disastrous consequences, where absolute strangers could walk into the Referral Court and contend that the matter has to perforce go to the Arbitral Tribunal for a decision on the veritable nature of the party. We are not prepared to accept such an extreme proposition. It could happen that one party having undertaken a contract from the other may engage one or more third parties like in the present case. In such a scenario, if there is nothing even prima facie to show that there was any semblance of an intent to effect legal relationship between that party and the party originally granting the contract and/or to indicate that such a third party was a veritable party, such parties cannot be found to be veritable parties.”. The Bench held that the respondent had not established its case to show even prima facie the existence of an arbitration agreement between HPCL and the respondent and that the respondent was a veritable party. The appeal was allowed and the judgment of the Bombay High Court was set aside. HINDUSTAN PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. v. BCL SECURE PREMISES PVT. LTD., CIVIL APPEAL NO.14647/2025, SUPREME COURT – 09 DECEMBER 2025. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Scope of jurisdiction of the referral court hearing a Section 11- Arbitration Petition December 10, 2025/Read More Employee in not less than five years of service entitled to payment of gratuity, regardless of retirement or resignation from… December 9, 2025/Read More Unnecessary remand of matters generates fresh round of litigation, should be avoided December 9, 2025/Read More  

Latest News Employee in not less than five years of service entitled to payment of gratuity, regardless of retirement or resignation from service. This case concerned a person selected and appointed as a conductor with the respondent Corporation. The deceased employee had opted for a new pension scheme introduced in the Corporation. He resigned from the job after about 29 years citing family circumstances. His resignation was accepted by the competent authority of the Corporation. Later on, a request was made for withdrawal of the resignation which was declined by the competent authority. Thereafter, the deceased employee requested the respondent for release of his retiral benefits i.e. gratuity, provident fund, leave encashment and pension. The Corporation informed him that since he had resigned from service, he was found entitled to only provident fund and no other benefit. Aggrieved against the order of the Corporation, an application was filed by the deceased employee before the Tribunal. The same was dismissed by the Tribunal. A review application was filed which was also dismissed by the Tribunal. The deceased employee then approached the High Court by filing a writ petition which was also dismissed. Aggrieved by the High Court, the appellant approached the Supreme Court. A 2-Judges Bench of the Supreme Court considered Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 and held – “9.1 A perusal of Rule 26 of the 1972 Rules clearly shows resignation from service entails forfeiture of past service… 9.2 Rule 36 of the 1972 Rules provides that the government servant who retired or compulsorily retired shall be granted retiring pension in accordance with Rules 48 and 48-A of the 1972 Rules. 9.3 Rule 48 of the 1972 Rules talks about eligibility or grant of pension on completion of 30 years of qualifying service. Whereas Rule 48-A thereof provides for such entitlement on completion of 20 years or more of qualifying service. In the case in hand, the deceased employee had not completed 30 years of service but certainly had more than 20 years service to his credit.”. The Bench referred to earlier judgments of the Supreme Court where it was opined that on resignation, past service of an employee stands forfeited and where the distinction between resignation and voluntary retirement was considered. The Bench held that upon resignation by an employee, his past service stood forfeited and hence, the deceased employee was not entitled to any pension. For payment of gratuity, the Bench considered Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and held – “that an employee who had rendered not less than five years of service will be entitled to payment of gratuity, regardless of the fact that he had retired or resigned from service”. For leave encashment, the respondent had fairly submitted that amount due to the deceased employee shall be paid to his family members. The appeal was partly allowed. ASHOK KUMAR DABAS (DEAD THROUGH LEGAL HEIRS) v. DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION, S.L.P.(C) No.4818 of 2023, SUPREME COURT – 09 DECEMBER 2025. Latest News Hearings Law Lawsuit Employee in not less than five years of service entitled to payment of gratuity, regardless of retirement or resignation from… December 10, 2025/Read More Unnecessary remand of matters generates fresh round of litigation, should be avoided December 9, 2025/Read More Growing trend of overturning judgments by succeeding Benches or specially constituted benches painful November 26, 2025/Read More